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Abstract
Why do governments borrow internationally, so much as to risk default? Why do they remain 
out of fi nancial markets for a while after default? This paper develops a quantitative model 
of sovereign default with endogenous default costs to propose a novel and unifi ed answer 
to these questions. In the model, the government has an incentive to borrow internationally 
due to a difference between the world interest rate and the domestic return on capital, which 
arises from a friction in the domestic banking sector. Since banks are exposed to sovereign 
debt, sovereign default causes losses for them, which translate into a fi nancial crisis. When 
deciding upon repayment, the government trades off these costs against the advantage 
of not repaying international investors. After default, it only reaccesses international capital 
markets once banks have recovered, because only then are they able to effi ciently allocate 
the marginal unit of investment again. Exclusion hence arises endogenously. The model 
is able to generate signifi cant levels of domestic and foreign debt, realistic spreads, 
quantitatively plausible drops of lending and output in default episodes, and periods of post-
default international fi nancial market exclusion of a realistic duration.
Keywords: sovereign default, banking crisis, endogenous cost of default, international capital 
market exclusion.
JEL classifi cation: F34, E62.
Resumen
¿Por qué los gobiernos se endeudan internacionalmente, tanto como para arriesgarse 
a quebrar? ¿Por qué permanecen fuera de los mercados fi nancieros durante un tiempo 
después del impago? Este documento desarrolla un modelo cuantitativo de impago 
soberano con costes de impago endógenos para proponer una respuesta nueva y unifi cada 
a estas preguntas. En el modelo, el gobierno tiene un incentivo para endeudarse en los 
mercados fi nancieros internacionales debido a una diferencia entre la tasa de interés mundial 
y el rendimiento sobre el capital nacional, que surge de una fricción en el sector bancario 
interno. Dada la exposición de los bancos a la deuda soberana, el impago soberano les 
causa pérdidas, que se traducen en una crisis fi nanciera. Al decidir sobre el reembolso 
de su deuda, el gobierno compara estos costes con la ventaja de no reembolsar a los 
inversores internacionales. Después del impago, el país solo vuelve a participar en los 
mercados fi nancieros internacionales una vez que los bancos se han recuperado, porque 
solo entonces pueden de nuevo asignar efi cientemente cada unidad marginal de inversión. 
La exclusión surge de manera endógena. El modelo puede generar niveles signifi cativos 
de deuda interna y externa, spreads realistas, reducciones de crédito interno y PIB 
cuantitativamente plausibles en episodios de impago, y períodos de exclusión del mercado 
fi nanciero internacional posterior al impago de una duración realista.
Palabras clave: impago de la deuda soberana, crisis bancaria, costes de impago soberano 
endógenos, exclusión de los mercados fi nancieros internacionales.
Códigos JEL: F34, E62.
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1 Introduction
Sovereign default episodes are relatively frequent, often dramatic and can occur even in de-
veloped economies, as the recent European debt crisis has demonstrated. A default episode
typically is a drama in three acts: During the first act, the government accumulates such large
amounts of debt that repayment becomes uncertain and spreads rise. The second act starts with
a tragic twist of fortune: The government defaults, which disrupts in particular the domestic
financial sector, leading to reduced economic activity. The government ceases to issue new debt
for a number of years. The last act finally sees the economy recovering and the government
reaccessing international financial markets once again.
This paper proposes a unified quantitative theory to explain not just the default event itself,
but also the beginning and the end of a typical default episode. First, the theory embodies
a novel rationale, based on differences in returns, for why governments want to borrow inter-
nationally. Second, it provides an explanation for the output costs of default. These costs
constitute a commitment device, which explains why and when governments repay and hence
why they can borrow in the first place. Third and perhaps most importantly, it explains the
temporary breakdown of international borrowing after default and its duration as an endoge-
nous outcome. These three features all result from the same mechanism, relying on interactions
between the sovereign and the domestic financial sector. This focus on intermediaries not only
reflects the recent experience in the European debt crisis. It is also in line with both existing
empirical findings that relate capital flows to financial frictions and sovereign default to finan-
cial crises as well as with a new finding documented in this paper that links market reaccess to
the recovery of the financial sector.
The model describes a small open economy populated by households, banks and firms,
which is governed by a benevolent government maximizing household utility. The government
can issue bonds, which are the only domestic asset that foreign investors can also invest in.
Firms produce output from labor and capital. Banks issue deposits to the household and
invest in loans to firms and sovereign bonds. Their capacity to intermediate private savings
within the economy is constrained by a leverage constraint. This friction in the intermediation
process drives a wedge between the private and the social return on capital. The inefficiency
resulting from this friction implies a motive for the government to borrow from foreign investors.
Sovereign debt is commitment free, that is, the government can default on it whenever it finds
it opportune to do so. There are no exogenous costs of default. However, since default is
nondiscriminatory, default not only hurts foreign investors, but also domestic banks, generating
a financial crisis in the domestic economy. This crisis depresses both output and the marginal
return on domestic investment. The latter makes it optimal for the government not to access
international capital markets for a while. The model is calibrated to Greek data and successfully
replicates important empirical moments related to the three novel features of the model.
An encompassing theory of default needs to explain why governments borrow systematically.
The literature on sovereign default following Eaton and Gersovitz (1981) and Arellano (2008)
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country is impatient relative to the international investors pricing the sovereign bond. My
theory provides an alternative endogenous motive to borrow: The explicit modeling of capital
and financial frictions implies that the social marginal return on domestic investment is higher
than private marginal return. Since in the ergodic distribution the latter is largely determined
by the households discount factor, this implies that the social marginal return exceeds the world
interest rate (most of the time) even if the domestic household has the same time preference
as the international investor. This difference in returns provides a motive for the government
to borrow abroad in order to lower taxes and hence stimulate private investment. This return
differential motive echoes the literature on international capital flows such as Gourinchas and
Jeanne (2013) and Benhima (2013). Unlike the impatience motive, which is usually calibrated
without direct evidence to unusually high degrees of impatience, the return differential motive
can be disciplined by measured spreads between loan and deposit rates. It is reassuring that
my modeling choice delivers reasonable quantitative results. In particular, the sovereign spread
is in line with the data and the amount of debt, while smaller than in the data, compares
favorably to the literature. Moreover, as will I argue in a few lines, the endogenous borrowing
motive is key for explaining the end of default episodes.
An encompassing theory of default furthermore needs to explain why and when sovereign
governments repay and default. Early contributions such as Arellano (2008) or Aguiar and
Gopinath (2006) answer these questions by assuming that default leads to capital market
exclusion and output losses and is hence costly. Subsequently, researchers attempted to en-
dogenously explain the incentives to default. This paper adds to this literature by proposing
a model where the costs of default arise from the exposure of the domestic financial sector to
domestic government debt:1 When the government defaults, the balance sheet of intermediaries
is hit. Due to financial frictions, this distorts capital allocation and hence leads to inefficiently
low output. Quantitatively, when calibrated to Greek data, the mechanism is able to generate
drops in output, credit and investment that are of similar magnitude as those observed around
the Greek default.
Finally, an encompassing theory of default should explain why default is typically followed
by a period of several years of market exclusion and how long this lasts. The conventional
view is to explain exclusion as a punishment strategy by lenders and to introduce it into
the model as an assumption. However, as argued by Kletzer (1994) this assumption is not
straightforward, since it would be profitable for each individual lender to deviate from the
punishment strategy. The theory I propose offers a novel interpretation of market exclusion.
To the best of my knowledge, my model is the first in which exclusion arises endogenously, as
an optimal choice by the government. During the financial crisis following default, the marginal
return on domestic investment is depressed. This is because the financial sector, which possesses
1Similar recent contributions are compared at the end of this section.
typically embeds the motive to borrow in the utility function by assuming that the borrowing
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a superior capital allocation technology, is unable to intermediate additional investment and
capital is hence allocated less efficiently without the help of banks at the margin. Hence, the
difference between the marginal domestic return and the world interest rate drops and may
become negative, making borrowing abroad temporarily undesirable for the government. As
time passes, however, the financial sector recovers, until it eventually intermediates the marginal
unit of investment again. In that moment the domestic marginal return on investment jumps
up and the government reenters international capital markets. In the next section I provide
novel empirical evidence that is consistent with this link between the recovery of the financial
system and the resumption of borrowing. Furthermore, this mechanism allows the model to
replicate the empirical distribution of the duration of exclusion well.
Having explored the quantitative implications of the model, it is then used to evaluate
a current policy proposal to reduce the exposure of European banks to domestic sovereign
debt. The model highlights that this may have unintended consequences: As bank exposure
is reduced, banks not only become more resilient to a sovereign debt crisis. Such a policy also
reduces the degree to which the government can commit to repay its debt, since the default costs
are reduced endogenously. According to the model, a 20% reduction in bank exposure cuts the
sustainable amount of foreign debt by one half. Since foreign debt is beneficial for the economy,
this comes at welfare costs equivalent to almost 1% of lifetime consumption equivalent. If
implemented abruptly, this reform would trigger default with a high probability.
Related literature. The paper is related to several strands of the literature on sovereign
default. The most innovative feature of my theory is endogenous exclusion. The study by
Benjamin and Wright (2013) focuses on a related issue. They model the debt renegotiation
process between defaulter and creditor, that − due to uncertainty − can potentially last many
years. During this time the country is assumed not to be able to borrow, hence they provide
a theory of the duration of renegotiations, but not of exclusion itself. My theory complements
theirs, highlighting how the incentives to borrow depend on the state of the domestic financial
sector, and can explain exclusion endogenously.2
Furthermore, by introducing capital this paper bridges the gap between the sovereign default
literature and the canonical RBC model. Guimaraes (2011), Roldán-Peña (2012), Joo (2014),
Gornemann (2015), Gordon and Guerrón-Quintana (2017) and Park (2017) also introduce
capital into an Eaton and Gersovitz (1981) default model. I add to these paper by also modeling
financial frictions and exploring how these can lead to a persistent motive to borrow and
endogenous costs of default.
Lastly, this paper contributes to a recent strand of literature that endogenizes the incentives
to default. While some contributions explore the distributional incentives of domestic default
2Kletzer and Wright (2000) show how exclusion may arise as a renegotiation proof punishment strategy
to make trade across states sustainable in an environment of state-contingent contracts and two-sided limited
commitment. However, theirs is not a theory of exclusion since exclusion never arises in equilibrium and its
duration off-equilibrium is undetermined.
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fault affects output. However, in these models banks finance the labor bill in advance through
intra-period loans, while in mine banks instead finance the capital stock. The introduction of
a domestic inter-period asset not only yields a more realistic bank balance sheet. Modeling
financial frictions and capital jointly also gives rise to a new motive to borrow and, moreover,
yields post-default exclusion as an endogenous outcome. Sosa-Padilla (2017) develops a stylized
model in which banks’ wealth directly serves as an input to production, without explicitly mod-
eling intermediation. In Boz et al. (2014) leverage constrained banks intermediate household
funds to firms. In Engler and Grosse Steffen (2016), Mallucci (2014) and Perez (2015) local
banks trade on interbank markets, and sovereign default brings these markets to collapse: in the
first and second case because sovereign bonds are necessary as collateral to facilitate interbank
lending and this collateral disappears in case of default, in the last because interbank borrowing
is leverage constrained. The collapse of the interbank markets then leads to efficiency losses.
Note that all of these papers simply assume exclusion and − apart from Sosa-Padilla (2017) −
they require this assumption to generate the financial crisis and the corresponding output costs
of default. The same is true for the trade crisis in Mendoza and Yue (2012). On the contrary,
my theory provides an explanation for exclusion and predicts its duration.3
This paper is also related more broadly to the macro literature on the role of frictions in
the financial sector, e.g. Gertler and Kiyotaki (2010). Bocola (2016) analyzes sovereign default
and its consequences in the context of the former model. While the setup is otherwise similar,
he considers the government’s decisions as exogenous.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. The next section briefly reviews the empirical
literature and provides some additional empirical evidence to motivate the quantitative model
of sovereign default, which is set up and discussed in section 3. Next, section 4 explains
the intuition behind the main mechanisms analytically. Section 5 discusses calibration and
solution method and explores the mechanisms further based on numerical illustrations. Section
6 presents the main quantitative results and section 7 uses the model to evaluate the effects
of a policy that reduces the exposure of banks to domestic sovereign debt. The last section
concludes.
3Furthermore, the idea that sovereign default inflicts costly damage on the financial sector is also developed
in a more stylized manner in 3-period models like Acharya et al. (2014), Basu (2010), Bolton and Jeanne (2011),
Brutti (2011), Erce (2012), Gennaioli et al. (2014) and Mayer (2011). Due to their 1-shot nature, none of these
models can speak about market exclusion or be tested quantitatively. Chari et al. (2016) analyzes the use of
financial repression (i.e. forced exposure of banks to the sovereign to gain commitment ) as a policy tool in an
analytical setup.
(D’Erasmo and Mendoza, 2012 and Guembel and Sussman, 2009), many focus on explaining the
output losses associated to default, most prominently Mendoza and Yue (2012), who highlight
the importance of international trade credit.
Within this strand, several papers also endogenize output costs by introducing a financial
sector. Like in my paper, in these models banks are exposed to sovereign debt and hence de-
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2 Empirical motivation
There is a large body of empirical literature that documents a number of empirical regularities
around sovereign default events, which motivate this model. First, external sovereign debt is
high for many countries and sovereign default is a relatively frequent event (e.g. Schmitt-Grohe
and Uribe, 2017).4 Second, sovereign default typically is followed by significant contractions
4Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe document 147 defaults in 93 nations between 1975 and 2014.
5Similar evidence is provided by De Paoli et al. (2006), Sturzenegger and Zettelmeyer (2007), Acharya et al.
(2014), Bolton and Jeanne (2011), Reinhart and Rogoff (2011b), Sosa-Padilla (2012) and Balteanu and Erce
(2017)
6As we shall see, in the model exclusion lasts as long as the financial sector is sufficiently constrained by its
leverage constraint as to not be the marginal investor in firm loans.
in economic activity (e.g. Mendoza and Yue, 2012) and periods of exclusion from interna-
tional capital markets (e.g. Gelos et al., 2011). Third, there exists a tight connection between
sovereign defaults and financial crisis. Gennaioli et al. (2014) for example compile an inter-
national panel comprising data on the macro economy, public debt and financial institutions’
balance sheets, covering 110 default episodes. They document four regularities that are key for
my model: (i) Domestic banks hold significant amounts of domestic sovereign debt. (ii) Defaults
often happen in close proximity to financial crises, with the former typically starting earlier or
simultaneously. (iii) Credit extended by the financial to the private sector drops significantly
in case of default and this drop is stronger, the more exposed banks are to sovereign debt.
(iv) Higher exposure of domestic banks to domestic sovereign debt reduces the probability of
default.5
By putting the financial system at the center, my model is able to reproduce all of these
patterns: First, it provides an explanation for why countries borrow and default. Second, it
predicts that default is followed by output losses and exclusion. Third it rationalizes these
consequences of default as the result of a domestic financial crisis, which triggers a reduction
in credit. Hence it explains how the banking sector’s exposure provides the government with
some commitment.
Furthermore, in providing a novel theory of market exclusion, the model yields another
testable prediction that has not yet been analyzed empirically. According to the model, market
exclusion is a result of the default-induced crisis in the financial sector, and its duration is
related to how long it takes for the financial sector to recover from the losses associated to the
sovereign default.6 If this mechanism is indeed relevant, we should be able to find a positive
relationship between the health of the financial sector and the date of reaccess.
In order to test this implication, I compile a data set covering default episodes since 1980,
which builds on existing empirical studies. The post-default exclusion episodes are taken from
Gennaioli et al. (2014) (GMR) and Cruces and Trebesch (2013) (CT). Both report default
episodes, however using different concepts to time the beginning and end of an episode. The
former define the start as the year when a country defaults, and the end as the year in which
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episodes are combined with data from the IMF’s IFS and the World Bank’s WDI databases,
from which I extract annual data on GDP, population and credit. As a proxy for the conditions
of the financial sector I use private credit to GDP, that is the volume of loans provided by
financial institutions to the private non-financial sector relative to GDP. This choice is both in
line with the model, which predicts reaccess only after banks balance sheets and hence credit
has recovered, as well as with previous empirical works such as GMR. All variables are in logs.
To validate the model’s prediction that reaccess is associated with recovery of the financial
sector, in figure 1 I first report the average evolution of credit to GDP around reaccess events
after controlling for country-specific linear trends. Indeed, governments reaccess international
capital markets only after credit has recovered from the low levels associated with the previous
default period. The figure also shows that real GDP per capita still is below trend when market
reaccess happens, which is an indication that credit conditions may matter independently of
the overall level of the economic activity.
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Figure 1: Credit and GDP around market reaccess. The figure shows the average behavior
of credit and GDP around reaccess events. The values shown are the results of an event analysis
as in Balteanu and Erce (2017) and Gourinchas and Obstfeld (2012). In particular, the lines
report the βτ estimates of the regression Yit = αi + α¯it +
∑4
τ=−4 βτDτit + εitwhere Dτit are the
τ years leads and lags of a dummy marking reaccess of country i in year t and where Yit is the
log of either credit/GDP or GDP. The estimates are reported in table 5 in appendix E.
7When combining the two data sets, most of the time the settlement periods coincide. Sometimes they
do not because GMR bunch default sequences into single episodes. In these cases I follow GMR. Six of CT’s
default episodes are not listed in GMR. I these cases I use the list of default episodes in Schmitt-Grohe and
Uribe (2017). For robustness I also consider the original GMR set, where I excluded those episodes that are
not associated with banking crises according to the definition in GMR. See the cited sources and the associated
online appendices for a more detailed description of the definitions they use.
it reaches a settlement with the creditors. By contrast, the latter define the start as the year
of settlement and the end as the year of market reaccess, which is defined as the first year
they observe either international bond or loan issuance or a net inflow of foreign funds to the
public sector. My theory speaks about default and reaccess, but does not explicitly model
settlement. Hence I use the start dates from GMR and the end dates from CT.7 These default
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 13 DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 1824
To corroborate this finding, I next estimate the effect of financial sector conditions on the
probability of an exclusion period ending. In order to address potential reverse causality issues,
I lag my explanatory variable. Hence I estimate the following logit model:
Pr(reaccess|post default exclusion)it = F
(
α + β(Credit_to_GDP)it−1 + γXit
)
where Xit are controls. Table 1 column (1) reports the results of this regression without
controls. Indeed, as the model predicts, credit contributes positively to the probability of
reaccess. However this result may be driven by spurious correlation. One may be concerned
that credit − even though relative to GDP − is just a reflection of overall economic activity.
Therefore, as in CT, I include real GDP growth, real GDP per capita and population, all
lagged. Besides one may be concerned that global credit conditions drive domestic credit and
reaccess, therefore I include a time dummy. Or one may be concerned that both reaccess and
the recovery of credit are simply a matter of time. To account for this possibility I include a
third order polynomial of the number years since default. Finally, country- or region-specific
characteristics that are correlated to credit to GDP may explain the exclusion duration, hence
region or country dummies are considered.8 As the table shows, the coefficients for the measures
8Country fixed effects are problematic due to the limited number of observations per country, since exclusion
periods are short and most countries do not reappear in the sample. I therefore interpret these specifications
as robustness check. I do not report results from the full model with country FE and the CT sample since the
number of observations that is not perfectly predicted by dummies drops by 2/3.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Private Creditt−1 0.0319*** 0.0266** 0.0394* 0.0276** 0.0336* 0.0319** 0.161** 0.129**
(0.000) (0.037) (0.052) (0.033) (0.086) (0.044) (0.021) (0.035)
Real GDP growtht−1 0.00304*** 0.00258* 0.000760 0.00157 0.00434* -0.00419 0.00153
(0.002) (0.093) (0.508) (0.283) (0.052) (0.238) (0.483)
Populationt−1 0.0160*** 0.0325*** 0.0255*** 0.0340*** 0.00646 1.740* 0.162
(0.009) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.515) (0.087) (0.927)
Real GDP pct−1 0.0455*** 0.0725*** 0.0457*** 0.0635*** 0.0359** 1.295*** 1.193**
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.013) (0.000) (0.042)
Region dummies     
Year dummies    
Duration dependence     
Country dummies  
default set CT CT CT CT CT GMR CT GMR
# default episodes 60 58 58 58 58 57 44 48
# re-accesses 52 50 50 50 50 63 48 55
# observations 686 667 450 667 450 509 502 425
Pseudo R2 0.021 0.088 0.201 0.229 0.270 0.240 0.727 0.597
Table 1: Determinants of market reaccess. The reported numbers are average marginal
effects and − in parenthesis − p-values, clustered at country level. #observations are adjusted
for observations perfectly predicted by dummies.
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3 The model
This section proposes a dynamic small open economy model of sovereign default, where the
only costs of default stem from the exposure of the domestic banking sector to the sovereign.
The domestic private economy is made up of 3 sectors, namely households, banks and firms
and is governed by a benevolent government. The domestic economy is open and can borrow
from international lenders (the rest of the world) through government bonds.
3.1 The households
There is a continuum of mass 1 of identical households, which each make a consumption-labor-
savings choice. The household can invest into bank deposits dh and loans to firms kh. Bank
deposits are promises to pay 1 unit of the final good tomorrow, which can be bought at price
1/r. r hence is the deposit rate. Loans are risk-free promises to repay R′ units of the final
good tomorrow. When lending directly to firms, the household incurs a cost ξ. Both assets are
safe and loans cannot be shorted.11 The household’s disposable income is the sum of the value
of its assets carried over from the last period dh + Rkh, his labor income Wlh and the lump
sum dividend and profit payments from the banks Div and the firms π, minus a lump sum tax
T . The household has rational expectations and chooses labor, consumption and investment to
maximize his lifetime utility, taking prices and aggregate states as given. Its problem hence is:
of financial sector conditions are positive and statistically significant across all specifications.
The estimates are also economically significant: Based on the average marginal effects of the
specifications without country fixed effects, a one standard deviation increase in private credit
increases the probability of market reaccess, which, depending on the sample, is between 5 and
10% unconditionally, by roughly 3 ppt.9
As common in the empirical literature on sovereign default, these results do not necessarily
imply causality.10 However they are certainly consistent with the mechanism that the model
highlights. They complement the result in CT, who find that higher haircuts are associated
with longer exclusion periods. While haircuts are not modeled in this paper, this finding is
consistent with the model’s mechanism too, since, ceteris paribus, higher haircuts imply larger
losses for the financial sector and hence longer recovery periods.
11Explicitly state contingent contracts or default are ruled out by assumption.
9As a robustness check I also considered equity/GDP as a dependent variable. Results are similar, however
unstable across the more satiated specifications and not always significant. This is not entirely surprising since
equity is available for a much smaller number of country-year observations. Furthermore, the presence of a
number of observations with negative values casts doubt on the reliability of this variable.
10In particular, anticipation of sovereign default might affect private credit positively, generating inverse
causality bias. Or there may be further omitted variables.
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Vh(d, kh,Ω) = maxc,d′
h
,k′
h
,lhu(c, lh) + βE|Ω Vh(d′h,Ω′)
st.
c + d′h/r + (1 + ξ)k′h + T = dh + Rkh + Wlh + Div + π (1)
k′h ≥ 0
where Ω denotes the aggregate state vector and Vh his value function. Instantaneous utility is
given by a conventional additively separable CRRA function:
u(c, lh) =
c1−γ
1 − γ − χ
l1+νh
1 + ν
The corresponding first order conditions are necessary and sufficient:
uc(c) = βrE|Ω [uc(c′)] (2)
uc(c)(1 + ξ) = βR′E|Ω [uc(c′)] + λh (3)
0 = min {λh , k′h} (4)
uc(c)W = ul(l) (5)
12ξ might also capture liquidity, maturity transformation or diversification services provided by banks.
13With the notable exception of the US, where market based funding plays an important role.
Since, as we shall see, households’ deposits are passed on to firms as loans, the household
essentially chooses between intermediated (bank loans) and direct financing of the real economy
(think of corporate bonds and entrepreneurial self finance). However, direct investment is
less efficient than intermediated investment due to the costs ξ, which is incurred on the first
but not on the latter. This assumption is common in the macro models with banks (e.g.
Brunnermeier and Sannikov (2014)). The idea behind it is that banks have a superior capital
allocation technology, since they are better at screening and monitoring (see Holmstrom and
Tirole (1997)).12 It explains why intermediation is desirable and why banks exist in equilibrium.
It is hence consistent with the fact that the financial sector intermediates a large part of
investment in many economies.13 Furthermore, allowing for a less efficient alternative form
of investment is in line with the finding that direct investment partially compensated for the
reduction in intermediated investment during banking crisis, documented for example by Fiore
and Uhlig (2015) for Europe and by Becker and Ivashina (2014) for the US.
The cost ξ is allowed to vary with TFP ω: ξ = ξ¯ωξˆ. We shall assume that ξˆ < 0, such
that the cost advantage of intermediated financing is particularly strong when the TFP is low.
This reflects the idea that the banks’ screening and monitoring technology is most useful, when
profitable investment opportunities are scarce.
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Assets Liabilities
Loans k′ Deposits d′/r
Government bonds q · b′ Post dividend equity e − div
which can equivalently be expressed by the balance sheet constraint:
qb′ + k′ = e − div + d′/r
Besides the balance sheet equation, the banker’s choice is constrained by several other
constraints. The first constraint is crucial. Following Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) I assume
that bankers face a commitment problem: At the end of a period (after investing) bankers can
repudiate their deposit liabilities. In that case the depositors would size a fraction θ < 1 of the
banks assets. This gives the banker the opportunity to renegotiate his liabilities. Depositors
anticipate this and will not let the value of deposits exceed the value of recoverable assets. This
translates into a leverage constraint, requiring the banker to hold a certain minimum of expected
pre-dividend equity tomorrow (weighted by the depositors’ stochastic discount factor):14
14The RHS is the household’s expected value of sizing the assets of an individual atomistic bank at the end
of period t. The LHS is the value of the deposit claim on that bank.
3.2 The banks
Banks are the key agents in this economy. Banks intermediate the savings from the households
to the firms and allocate them more efficiently than if the household invests directly, yet they
are constrained by a financial friction that gives rise to a leverage constraint. It is this constraint
that will ultimately make foreign debt desirable and default costly for the government.
There is continuum of mass 1 of banks, each of which is run by a banker. (In this subsection,
I drop the index b to simplify notation.) The banker enters each period with a portfolio of 1-
period assets and liabilities (his balance sheet) chosen last period. In particular, he holds k
units of firm loans, which pay the ex-ante fixed gross return R and b units of government bonds,
which return 1 if repaid (Rep = 1), otherwise they return nothing (Rep = 0); and (3) he owes
depositors d. The net cash flow of these assets and liabilities defines the bank’s pre-dividend
equity e.
e = Rk + bRep − d
Next, the banker chooses how much dividend div to pay to his shareholders. The remaining
resources are kept on the balance sheet as post-dividend equity e−div. Given the post-dividend
equity, the banker next chooses his optimal portfolio of assets and liabilities: he can invest in
loans to firms k′ at price 1, buy government bonds b′ at price q, and issue deposits d′ at price
1/r. Note the above mentioned superiority of banks in allocating capital: to provide one unit
of loan the bank pays one unit, while the household pays 1 + ξ. This yields the following
end-of-period balance sheet:
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E|Ω
[
β
uc(c′)
uc(c)
]
d′ ≤ E|Ω
[
β
uc(c′)
uc(c)
θ(Rep′ b′ + R′ k′)
]
Second, the banker’s dividend choice is constrained downwards, it can not be smaller than
a certain (1 − η) fraction of equity.
div ≥ (1 − η)e
This assumption, which is common in the macro literature on financial frictions,15 makes sure
that the leverage constraint introduced above bites: One the on hand, the banker cannot simply
raise new equity should he require more. On the other hand, the fact that he constantly has
to payout a positive dividend ensures that he also cannot overcome the equity constraint over
time by accumulating retained earnings. Moreover, this assumption reflects reality.Banks seem
to have difficulties raising capital especially in times of crisis and they generally try to smooth
their dividends.
Third, the bank has to hold at least a fraction ψ of government bonds on the balance sheet:
b′q
b′q + k′ ≥ ψ
This simple constraint is intended to capture, in a reduced form, a number of reasons that
induce banks to invest heavily into domestic sovereign bonds. These reasons may for example
be related to financial regulation, financial repression or the special role of bonds as liquid or
collateral asset.16 Appendix D provides a simple model to rationalize this assumption in a model
where banks hold a certain amount of bonds for either liquidity or collateral reasons. Whatever
the exact nature of these forces, it is a well documented empirical fact that banks exhibit a
strong home bias and are heavily exposed to domestic sovereign debt: Sosa-Padilla (2012) and
Gennaioli et al. (2014) report that on average 22% or 12% respectively of the financial sector’s
assets in each country in their samples are domestic sovereign debt. Note that this constraint is
crucial for the equilibrium of the model, in which bonds will generally pay a lower risk adjusted
return than loans and where the banks exposure is necessary to sustain any foreign lending.
Fourth, next period equity must not be negative, even in case of sovereign default.
R′k′ ≥ d′
Finally, there is no short selling of assets.
b′ ≥ 0, k′ ≥ 0
15E.g. Gertler and Kiyotaki (2010), who motivate an equivalent assumption by retiring bankers.
16For a model with a liquidity motive for holding government bonds see Engler and Grosse Steffen (2016).
Besides, notice that regulation and repression could be considered policy variables as well. I abstract from these
considerations. For a model with optimal financial repression see Chari et al. (2016).
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system of first order conditions
∂L/∂d′ : 0 = uc(c)/r − βE|Ω [Vbe(e′,Ω′)] − λ1E|Ω [uc(c′)] + λ2/r (6)
∂L/∂b′ : 0 = −quc(c) + βE|Ω [Rep′Vbe(e′,Ω′)] + λ1E|Ω [Rep′uc(c′)] θ − λ2q + λ3q(1 − ψ)(7)
∂L/∂k′ : 0 = −uc(c) + βR′E|Ω [Vbe(e′,Ω′)] + λ1R′E|Ω [uc(c′)] θ − λ2 − λ3ψ (8)
∂L/∂λ1 : 0 = min
{
E|Ω [uc(c)θ(Rep′ b′ + R′k′)] − E|Ω [uc(c′)d′] , λ1
}
(9)
∂L/∂λ2 : 0 = min {ηe − qb′ − k′ + d′/r , λ2} (10)
∂L/∂λ3 : 0 = min {b′q − (b′q + k)ψ , λ3} (11)
where Vbe(e′,Ω′), the derivative of the value function with respect to equity, is given by
Vbe(e′,Ω′) = uc(c′) + ηλ′2. The solution is linear in pre-dividend equity e.
Proof: appendix C. The last statement implies that the distribution of equity among banks
does not matter, which allows us to represent the banking sector by a representative bank.18
The banker is a small member of the household, to whom he pays the dividend, and has
rational expectations. He maximizes the discounted value of dividends, taking the household
discount factor, the prices and the law of motion of the aggregate state as given. Her objective
function reads
Vb(d, b, k,Ω) = maxb′,k′d′,div div + E|Ωβ
uc(c′)
uc(c)
Vb (d′, b′, k′,Ω′)
After multiplying the objective function by uc(c), using the balance sheet constraint to
substitute for div, rearranging and abstracting from the short selling constraints, which cannot
be binding in any equilibrium with banking, and the non-negativity constraint on equity,17 the
banks problem is:
Vb(d, b, k,Ω) = maxb′,k′d′ (e + d′/r − qb′ + k′)uc(c) + βE|Ω [Vb (d′, b′, k′,Ω′)]
st.
E|Ω [uc(c′)d′] ≤ E|Ω [uc(c′)θ(Rep′ b′ + R′ k′)]
(1 − η)e ≤ e + d′/r − qb′ − k′
ψk′ ≤ b′q(1 − ψ)
where e = Rk + bRep − d
The solution of the bank’s dynamic problem can conveniently be characterized:
Proposition 1: The vector of choice variables [b′, d′, k′] ∈
(
R
+
0
)3
is a solution to the banks
problem if and only if together with the vector of multipliers [λ1, λ2, λ3] ∈
(
R
+
0
)3
it solves the
18The penultimate statement allows us to eliminate all references to the value function from the FOCs and
to conveniently characterize the bank’s optimal choice in terms of policy functions alone.
( )
17The model will be parametrized such that abstracting from the constraint on equity remains irrelevant.
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3.3 The firms
There is a continuum of mass 1 of firms. The problem of the firm is a 2-period problem. In the
first period the firm borrows kf units from the banks and households at a fixed interest rate R′,
which she transforms into capital for period 2. In the second period the firm hires lf units of
labor from the households and produces. The firm uses a standard Cobb-Douglas production
function with capital share α and stochastic TFP ω. Capital depreciates at rate δ. TFP ω
follows a log-normal AR(1) process with persistence ρ and innovations ε with variance σ2
log(ω) = ρlog(ω−1) + σε
Like the banker, the firm manager is part of the household, to whom any profits or losses
π are rebated lump sum and whose stochastic discount factor the firm manager takes as given.
Her sequential optimization problem is
maxk′
f
E|Ω
[(
β
uc(c′)
uc(c)
)(
ω′
(
k′f
)α (
lˆ(ω′)
)1−α
+ (1 − δ)k′f − R′k′f − W (ω′)lˆ(ω′)′
)]
s.t
lˆ(ω′) = argmaxl′
f
ω′
(
k′f
)α (
l′f
)1−α
+ (1 − δ)k′f − Rk′f − W (ω′)l′f
The FOCs determining the loan rate and the wage are necessary and sufficient:
R′ = E|Ω
[
uc(c′)
(
ω′αkα−1f l
′
f
1−α + (1 − δ)
)]
/E|Ω [uc(c′)] (12)
W = ω(1 − α)kαf l−αf (13)
19Assuming that banks carry some of the risk associated with firm investment would change the quantitative
properties of the model, since it would introduce a negative correlation between the innovation in TFP and
bank equity and would hence reduce the degree to which default incentives increase in TFP.
I have assumed that firm loans are riskless contracts. Hence it is the firms’ owners (the
household) and not the banks who absorb aggregate risk, unlike e.g. in Gertler and Kiyotaki
(2010) where banks hold firm equity. My assumption mimics reality: most of banks assets are
loans, which have a flat repayment profile as long as they are not defaulted upon. I abstract
from firm default both for simplicity and to isolate the effects of sovereign default.19 Besides,
note that in the absence of financial frictions, both assumptions are equivalent.
3.4 The foreign investors
The model describes a small open economy. The rest of the world is represented by perfectly
competitive risk neutral deep pocket foreign investors. I assume that lending to domestic pri-
vate agents requires local know-how and is hence not possible or profitable for foreign investors,
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By Walras’ law the goods market clears as well.
This concludes the set up of the private economy. Before we move to the problem of
the government, which will choose its tax, borrowing and repayment policy, it is convenient
to define the notion of a private equilibrium, given a arbitrary set of government policies
T (Ω), BT (Ω), Rep(Ω).
Definition 1: Private equilibrium Given set of state dependent government policy func-
tions T (Ω), B′T (Ω), Rep(Ω) a stationary private equilibrium consists of a set of state dependent
policy functions C(Ω), LH(Ω), D′H(Ω), K ′H(Ω), D′B(Ω), B′B(Ω), K ′B(Ω), K ′F (Ω), LF (Ω), B′X(Ω)
price functions r(Ω), q(Ω), R′(Ω), W (Ω) and shadow price functions λ1(Ω), λ2(Ω), λ3(Ω), λH(Ω)
such that the maximization problems of the household, the bank and the firm are solved, the
foreign lenders’ demand is satisfied, markets clear and such that the policy functions imply the
state transition function that underlies the agents’ expectations.
but they can invest in the 1-period government bond. They demand any amount of govern-
ment bonds if their expected return equals the world interest rate 1/q¯. Foreign demand for
government bonds, denoted by B′X , is hence given by
B′X ∈
⎧⎪⎨⎪⎩0 if E|ΩRep
′/q < 1/q¯
[0,M ] if E|ΩRep′/q = 1/q¯
(14)
where M is an arbitrarily large number. This upper bound is assumed to never bind in equi-
librium, however it rules out Ponzi schemes.
3.5 Market clearing
Having discussed all private agents, we are now ready to close the private economy by the
corresponding market clearing conditions. From now I will denote aggregate choice variables
by capital letters, i.e.
´ 1
o
xidi = XI where i is the respective agent’s index (which was suppressed
for banks before) and I its type. Labor market clearing requires
LF = LH (15)
Loan and deposit market clearing implies
K ′F = K ′H + K ′B (16)
D′B = D′H (17)
Finally, bond markets clear when the total government debt issuance B′T equals the total
demand by foreigners B′X and local banks B′B
B′B + B′X = B′T (18)
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Call the vector of policy, price and shadow price functions X(Ω). Denote the system of
functional equations over the domain Ω, which is defined by equations (2)-(18) after replacing
all individual variables with the corresponding aggregate variables, by F(X,T,BT , Rep|Ω) = 0.
Then, since all first order conditions are necessary and sufficient, an equivalent way of defining
a stationary private equilibrium is: X(Ω) such that F(X,T,B′T , Rep|Ω) = 0 ∀ Ω given some
T (Ω), BT (Ω), Rep(Ω).
What are the state variables in this problem? First, we need to keep track of TFP ω, which
is the only exogenous state. Second, we need to account for the balance sheets of households
and banks. This encompasses the loans extended by the household KH ; the deposits issued
by the bank and bought by the household, D; the loans extended by the bank KB; the bonds
bought by the bank BB and the loan rate R. Third, Ω encompasses the amount of outstanding
sovereign debt held abroad BX , because this variable influences the government policy choices,
that are discussed next. The state vector is hence Ω = [ω,KH , D,BB, KB, R,BX ].
3.6 The government
The model economy is governed by a benevolent government, which chooses its actions such as
to maximize the households’ utility. It needs to finance some fixed government expenditures
G and it can do so by taxing the household through a lump sum tax T and issuing 1-period
government bonds B′T , which are a promise to repay 1 unit tomorrow and are traded at price
q.20 These bonds are sold on anonymous markets, where both local banks and international
investors can buy them. Note that unlike the government, private agents can not trade assets
directly with the rest of the world. This is a simplifying assumption, which could generally
be relaxed as long as foreign lenders have some disadvantage in direct investment. At the
same time it is a plausible approximation for many less financially integrated economies, where
20Following the literature, I rule out explicitly state contingent contracts and I assume lump sum taxation.
The latter simplifies the model by avoiding a motive for distortion smoothing.
private borrowing makes up for only a small part of the total net foreign asset position, such
as Greece for example.
While it is known who buys the bonds (banks buy B′B, foreign lenders invest B′X), the
government cannot discriminate buyers, neither at the time of issuance nor at the time of
repayment. This assumption is key and discussed below.
Following standard practice in the literature I assume that sovereign debt is non-enforceable
and the government cannot commit to future actions; i.e. the government is free to choose to
repay its debt (Rep = 1) or to fully default on its obligations (Rep = 0) at the beginning of
each period after observing the realization of the TFP shock.
In case of default there is no direct punishment: in particular foreign lenders do not cat-
egorically refrain from lending, and no direct output costs arise. Yet I assume that following
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Note that the condition (22) constrains the government’s choices to be consistent with a
private equilibrium. Also note that in (19) we do not need to distinguish between the value of
being in default or not, as is common in the default literature. This is because we make no
particular assumptions about post default periods, such as exogenous costs of default.
Definition 2: Full equilibrium A stationary equilibrium in this economy is defined by
a set of value functions VH(Ω), VG(Ω), government policy functions T (Ω), B′T (Ω), Rep(Ω),
private policy functions C(Ω), LH(Ω), D′H(Ω), K ′H(Ω), D′B(Ω), B′B(Ω), K ′B(Ω), K ′F (Ω), LF (Ω),
B′X(Ω), price functions r(Ω), q(Ω), R′(Ω), W (Ω) and shadow price functions λ1(Ω), λ2(Ω),
default the government effectively can not save abroad, because its foreign assets would else be
seized by the creditors.21 This gives rise to the following government budget constraint:
q · B′T + T ≥ BT · Rep + G
B′X ≥ 0
It is important to note that the government has rational expectations and − unlike the
private agents − is non-atomistic. This means it understands how its own decisions influence the
choices and expectations of households, banks, firms and foreign lenders. While no direct default
costs are assumed, the government understands that defaulting erodes the banks’ equity, reduces
their capacity to intermediate and hence leads to lower capital and therefore less production and
income for the household. This is how default becomes costly to the government − despite the
absence of any direct punishment − and hence why it may choose to repay ex post. Furthermore,
the government understands that its decision how much new debt to issue influences the private
sector’s actions, in particular the households’ savings choice, and expectations, in particular
on the probability of default and hence the current bond price. Furthermore, the government
understands its commitment problem and correctly anticipates how the behavior of the private
sector and the government in the future depend on the future state vector.
We can summarize the government’s problem as follows
VG(Ω) = maxRep,T,B′T ,XVH(Ω) (19)
st.
q · B′T + T ≥ BT · Rep + G (20)
B′X ≥ 0 (21)
0 = F(X,T,B′T , Rep|Ω) (22)
21An equivalent alternative to this assumption would be a sufficiently high spread between the borrowing and
savings rate. In the optimization problem of the government below, I enforce this constraint also before default.
This simplifies matters and is innocuous since in equilibrium the constraint only binds after default for the part
of the parameter space that we are interested in.
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λ3(Ω), λH(Ω) such that the governments problem (19) is solved subject to its budget constraint
(20), the non-negativity constraint (21) and the equilibrium conditions of the private economy
(22). Appendix A presents the government’s problem in full detail.
Intuitively, one can think about the equilibrium as an infinitely repeated game. Each
period the government moves first choosing the new debt and tax levels and whether to default,
anticipating correctly the reactions of the private agents, which in turn have correct expectations
about the future. Yet another way to think about the full equilibrium is a private equilibrium
that is associated with a set of time-consistent (i.e. commitment free) optimal government
policy functions. Notice that this equilibrium notion coincides both with that of time consistent
policy in Klein et al. (2008) and the equilibrium applied in the sovereign default literature in
the tradition of Eaton and Gersovitz (1981).22
Before moving on to the next section, a few words are in order on the assumption that the
government cannot default selectively and cannot bail out domestic banks after default. These
assumptions are key to generate the endogenous costs of default that sustain an equilibrium
with external debt. If the government could choose to default only on foreign lenders, or
equivalently to inject equity into domestic banks after defaulting, external default would be
costless an hence always ex-post optimal. Since foreigners would anticipate that, no foreign
lending could be sustained.
Theoretically, both assumptions can be justified by secondary markets, as Broner et al.
(2010) show. In anonymous markets, if the government planned to default selectively (or to
bail some lenders out) the defaulted upon would simply sell to the exempted (bailed out).
The non-selectivity of default is plausible also empirically. While there have been a few cases
of selective default, they were typically not with respect to the holder, but to the currency
(Moody’s (2008)) or the legislation (Reinhart and Rogoff (2011a)) of the bond. It seems rather
hard to target the holders of the bond. The empirical case for no bailouts seems a bit harder to
make, given that we do see that government defaults are often accompanied by bank bailouts. I
nevertheless follow the literature (e.g. Gertler and Kiyotaki (2010), Sosa-Padilla (2012), Engler
and Grosse Steffen (2016)) and rule them out. This must be understood as an approximation
for the fact that these rescue packages (1) typically do not fully compensate for the full default
22Nicolini et al. (2015) compares this equilibrium notion to alternative ones, where the government lacks the
first mover advantage, which can give rise to self-fulfilling equilibria.
23Political costs can arise because the population perceives that banks were “accomplices” in bringing upon
the dire situation the country finds itself in or because they are provided by an external agent like the IMF who
enforces some conditionality.
losses, (2) are politically costly,23 (3) need to be financed by distortionary taxation and (4)
are subject to complicated legal constraints and does justice to the fact that financial crises,
despite all policy efforts, are very damaging for the real economy.
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(decrease) in E. Hence the profit margin and deposit-loan spread decrease in E. When E
becomes so large that the leverage constraint turns slack, the profit margin reaches zero.
We shall assume that the leverage constraint indeed binds most of the time in the ergodic
distribution, which is assured by assuming a minimum dividend payout ratio 1 − η sufficiently
larger than 1−β. The profit margin implies that the return on intermediated investment, which
households privately perceive, is lower than its social return. Households therefore under-invest
in deposits and hence in intermediated loans. At the heart of this underinvestment in banks
4 Dissecting the mechanism analytically: Financial fric-
tions, the motive to borrow and endogenous exclusion
This section analyzes the two novel features of the model analytically: The borrowing motive
and self-exclusion. I start by showing how the financial frictions affect investment in capital.
Then I present a simplified version of the model. This model is then used in the subsequent
two subsections to explain how financial frictions gives rise to a motive to borrow and why this
motive may vanish, leading to post default exclusion from international financial markets.
4.1 Underinvestment due to the financial friction
In the model economy the household has two ways to invest into physical capital: either by
directly lending to the firm, or indirectly by depositing savings at the bank, which in turn lends
to the firm. Bank intermediated investment is assumed to be more efficient, but the capacity
of banks to intermediate is constrained by a leverage constraint.
Intermediated loans. As is well known from the literature on financial frictions, the
leverage constraint − when it binds − drives a wedge between the return on bank investment
and the cost of deposits r, even though banks behave competitively. To see this combine
equations (6)-(8) and abstract for convenience from the covariance terms to get
r =
[
ψ
E|Ω [Rep′]
q
+ (1 − ψ)R′
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
return on bank investment
βE|ΩVbe(e′,Ω′) + λ1θE|Ω [uc(c′)]
βE|ΩVbe(e′,Ω′) + λ1E|Ω [uc(c′)]︸ ︷︷ ︸
wedge
This tells us that in equilibrium the deposit rate r equals the expected return on the bank’s
investment portfolio if the leverage constraint is slack, i.e. if the associated multiplier λ1 = 0.
On the contrary, if the constraint binds and hence λ1 > 0, then the deposit rate has to be lower
than the bank’s return (since θ < 1 ). I shall refer to this difference as the bank’s profit margin.
If banks hold only loans, i.e. for ψ → 0, this margin converges to the deposit-loan spread.
Notice that we can expect the bank’s profit margin and the deposit loan spread to weakly
decrease in equity. When the constraint binds, an increase in equity E ceteris paribus leads
to higher demand for assets and deposits by the bank. Since ceteris paribus the households’
supply of deposits increases in the deposit rate, and the firms’ demand for loans decreases in
the loan rate, in general equilibrium we can expect the deposit rate r (loan rate R′) to increase
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is a positive externality: When making their deposit choice, households only take the deposit
rate into account, but not the profit margin of the bank. In doing so the household ignores
that these profits on the one hand relax the leverage constraint in the future and on the other
hand flow back to the household as lump sum dividend payments.
Direct loans. The households’ direct investment technology is not affected by the leverage
constraint, it is however assumed to be less efficient. This technology will hence only be used,
if the deposit-loan spread on intermediated investment is large enough. To see this combine
the household’s FOCs (2) and (3) to get
ξr − (R′ − r) = λH/
(
βE|Ω [uc(c′)]
)
If the deposit-loan spread is small enough, i.e. if R′ − r < rξ, then the multiplier on the
non-negativity constraint on direct loans λH is positive and hence the household undertakes no
direct investment K ′H = 0. If the spread reaches its maximum R′ − r = rξ, then λH = 0 and
the household may extend direct loans K ′H ≥ 0.
Depending on how scarce capital and hence how high the deposit-loan spread is, the non-
negativity constraint on direct investment K ′H may bind or not. I assume that parameters are
such that in the ergodic distribution the constraint binds most of the time, i.e. banks usually
will intermediate all investment. I will refer to such times as “normal times”.
Marginal investors. Notice that as long as λH > 0 and K ′H = 0 the bank is the marginal
investor in loans, even if the leverage constraint binds: A larger supply of savings by the
household increases the bank’s profit margin, the deposit-loan spread and λ1. The widening
of the profit margin relaxes the leverage constraint, accommodating additional intermediated
investment. However, once the spread reaches its maximum such that R′−r = rξ, the household
may become the predominant marginal investor. To see this, combine the leverage constraint
(9), the dividend payout rule (10), the bond holding requirement (11) (assume they all bind),
and the foreign bond demand (14) and abstract for convenience from covariance terms to get
K ′B = ηE
[
ψ
1 − ψ
(
1 − θ 1
rq¯
)
+
(
1 − θR
′
r
)]−1
Now if R′ − r = rξ and banks hold mainly loans ψ → 0, then this expression simplifies to
K ′B = ηE/ (1 − θ(1 + ξ)). Hence the amount of loans the bank can intermediate K ′B is fixed
and any additional savings must flow into direct investment K ′H . The household now is the
marginal investor in loans. The situation is a little more complicated if R′ − r = rξ and
ψ > 0. In this case an increase in the supply of savings drives down the deposit and loan
rates proportionally: R′ = r(1 + ξ). This potentially increases the bank’s profit on its bond
holdings and thus loosens the above constraint on bank loans K ′B through the r inside the left
parenthesis. Banks and households are both marginal investors. However, for small ψ such
as in my calibration this effect − and hence the banks contribution to the marginal loan − is
negligible. The household therefore is the predominant marginal investor.
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4.2 A simplified version of the model
In the context of an open economy model with a benevolent government, underinvestment
in intermediated loans implies a motive for the government to borrow abroad. However, this
motive may disappear when banks cease to be the (only) marginal investors and the households
instead (predominantly) undertake marginal investment, hence giving rise to self-exclusion from
international financial markets.
To explain this time varying borrowing motive analytically, let me simplify the model. In
particular, for the rest of this section I shall abstract from uncertainty (ω = 1), government
spending (G = 0), labor (ν → ∞) and domestic holdings of bonds (ψ = 0), assume full
depreciation (δ = 1) and that the government can borrow internationally in non-contingent
bonds under full commitment up to a limit BmaxX > 0.
Besides, I simplify the modeling of the banking sector. I assume that banks charge an
exogenously given relative deposit-loan spread s and they are subject to an exogenous constraint
on the size of their asset holdings. This means that the banks’ FOCs can be replaced by the
deposit pricing equation sr = R′ and an upper bound on bank loans K ′B ≤ KmaxB . Furthermore
assume that s ∈ [1, 1 + ξ] and that KmaxB is such that it binds only when s takes its maximal
value. The latter assumption determines the identity of the marginal investor, in the same
way that it endogenously arises in the full model: Banks are the marginal investor in “normal
times” when the spread is moderate, the household is the marginal investor when the spread
is at its maximum. This simplified model of the banking sector can be understood as a partial
equilibrium representation of the full model, where the government does not take into account
the effect of its choices on the deposit-loan spread and the banks’ balance sheet capacity.
Furthermore, for convenience define the world interest rate R¯ ≡ 1/q¯. This results in the
following model:
VG(Ω) = maxC,T,λH ,r,R′,B′X ,K′H ,K′B
C1−γ
1−γ + βE [V
′
G]
s.t.
Household FOCs
C−γ = βrE
[
C ′−γ
]
C−γ(1 + ξ) = βR′E
[
C ′−γ
]
+ λH
0 = min {λH ,KH}
(KB + KH)α = C + K ′B + K ′H + T
Firm & Bank FOCs
R′ = α(KB + KH)α−1
sr = R
K ′B ≤ KmaxB
Govt. Budget Cons.
T = BX − B′X/R¯
0 ≤ B′X ≤ BmaxX
This stripped down model is simple enough to be analytically tractable, yet it incorporates
the same financial frictions that make international borrowing desirable and at times can lead
to market exclusion as the full model: The household’s savings choice (and hence its Euler
equation) is distorted by a spread, its investment technology is inferior to that of banks, and
firms cannot borrow from abroad. Let us solve the model, distinguishing between the two cases
where either the bank or the household is the marginal investor.
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Case 1: Banks as marginal investors. First assume that the spread is below its maximal
value and that the bank is the marginal investor (KH = 0, λH > 0, KB ≤ KmaxB not binding).
After substituting out C, T , r, R′, B′X and K ′H and ignoring the inequality constraints, we can
derive a tractable FOC for K ′. After substituting R′ and C back in it reads:
0 = ∂VG
∂K ′B
=
(
α
1
γ β
1
γ s
−1
γ K
′ α
γ
B + R¯K
′ 1
γ
B
)γ−2 (
C
((
αβs−1K ′α−1B
) 1
γ + R¯
))−γ 1
γK ′B︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
× (23)
×
[(
R¯
K ′1
)
(1 − α) C
K ′B
(βR′/s)
1
γ + R¯
R′︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
(
R′ − sR¯
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0 if sR¯>R′
+γ
⎛⎝sR¯
R′
+
(
R′
s
) 1
γ
−1
β
1
γ + R¯
(βR′/s)
1
γ
+ 1
⎞⎠
︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
(
R′ − R¯
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0 if R′>R¯
(
R¯
K ′1
)]
This condition implicitly defines an optimal marginal product of capital (MPK) Rˆ′1, which
the government would like to achieve − if the inequality constraints allow. Inspecting the
second line of this condition provides two insights. First, the optimal MPK Rˆ′1 is time-varying
and slightly higher than the world interest rate R¯: R¯ < Rˆ′1 < R¯s. Second, if the marginal
return on capital R′ exceeds this threshold (R′ > Rˆ′1), then the derivative ∂VG∂K′B is positive. That
is, the government wants to borrow internationally as long as the marginal return on capital
R′ exceeds a certain threshold Rˆ′1.
Note that the higher the preference for consumption smoothing γ, the higher the relative
weight of the expression in the last bracket. I.e., as γ → ∞ the FOC implies that the threshold
value equals the world interest rate Rˆ′1 = R¯. Conversely, as γ → 0 the FOC becomes Rˆ′1 = sR¯.24
For convenience, let us make the approximation that Rˆ′1 ≈ R¯ − either because γ is large or s
close to 1. Under this approximation the government’s optimal policy is
B′X =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
BmaxX if R′(BmaxX ) > R¯
Bˆ′X1 if Bˆ′X1 ∈ [0, BmaxX ]
0 if R′(0) < R¯
where Bˆ′X1 ≡
(
BX ∈ R | R′(BX) = R¯
)
I.e. the government would like to borrow so much as to implement the allocation where the MPK
equals the world interest rate. If this objective violates the bounds on B′X it chooses the closest
corner solution. If the government borrows, it does so because the household, anticipating
future taxes, invests most of its additional disposable income due to lower current taxes in
24When agents do not value consumption smoothing, the deposit rate is constant and so is the capital stock.
Borrowing by the government hence does not lead to additional savings. In this situation the desirability of
borrowing depends on whether the deposit rate (i.e. 1/β) is above or below the world interest rate.
domestic capital, which has a marginal social return R′ that exceeds the cost of international
funds R¯.
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Case 2: Households as marginal investors. Let us next assume that the household is
the marginal investor in the current period. I.e. assume that s = 1+ξ and that the upper-bound
on the banks balance sheet binds K ′B = KmaxB for all possible debt levels B′X ∈ [0, BmaxX ].25 The
FOC of this version of the government’s problem, ignoring the inequality constraints on B′X
and K ′H , is:26
∂VG
∂K ′H
= C ′−γ
(
R′/(1 + ξ) − R¯
)
= 0 (24)
Again, this condition defines an optimal MPK Rˆ′2 ≡ R¯(1 + ξ). The inequality constraints
permitting, the government hence would like to borrow so much from abroad B′X that the total
capital stock K ′H +KmaxB is such that the MPK is Rˆ′2. Analogously to case 1, taking the bounds
on B′X into account yields the following optimal foreign debt level
B′X =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
BmaxX if R′(BmaxX ) > R¯(1 + ξ)
Bˆ′X2 if Bˆ′X2 ∈ [0, BmaxX ]
0 if R′(0) < R¯(1 + ξ)
where Bˆ′X2 ≡
(
BX ∈ R | R′(BX) = R¯(1 + ξ)
)
Summary of cases 1 & 2. The optimal borrowing choice for both cases can conveniently
be summarized as follows. Define the marginal social return on investment R′m as
R′m ≡
⎧⎪⎨⎪⎩R
′ if KH = 0
R′/(1 + ξ) if KH > 0
Lemma 1: Under the approximation Rˆ′1 ≈ R¯, it is optimal for the government to borrow
B′X =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
BmaxX if R′m(BmaxX ) > R¯
Bˆ′X if Bˆ′X ∈ [0, BmaxX ]
0 if R′m(0) < R¯
where Bˆ′X ≡
(
BX ∈ R | R′m(BX) = R¯
)
This implies the following optimality condition: The government borrows if the social
marginal return R′m exceeds the world interest rate R¯. The government does not borrow if
the world interest rate exceeds the social marginal return.
4.3 A new motive to borrow internationally
The simple model delivered an intuitive and simple optimality condition. Recall, that in section
4.1 I assumed that in the full model the bank is the marginal investor in “normal times”. That
25The assumption that the constraint on K ′B binds regardless of BX is wlg.. It can be relaxed to allow that
the constraint binds only for B′X exceeding a certain threshold at the expense of complicating expressions.
26Once KH > 0 the household’s relevant Euler equation is undistorted and the private equilibrium conditions
besides K ′B = KmaxB are not strictly binding.
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is case 1 is the case that best resembles the full model for most of the ergodic distribution.
Therefore let us consider the optimal debt level in the steady state in case 1 (assuming a SS
exists).
Can we expect the condition R′m > R¯ to hold in steady state? In steady state the deposit
rate r is equal to the discount factor 1/β. Since the marginal social return in case 1 is the loan
rate (R′m = R′), which is given by the deposit rate times the spread (R′ = rs), the condition
is satisfied if s
β
> R¯. That is, even if − as I shall assume − the household is as patient as the
foreign investors pricing the bond (β = q¯ ≡ 1/R¯), foreign borrowing is desirable in the long
run as long as the deposit-loan spread s is positive.
In sum, the existence of capital, together with the financial frictions that prevent the
marginal social return on capital R′ to converge to the world interest rate R¯ over time,27
constitute a non-transitory motive for government borrowing: When choosing whether to fi-
nance current government expenditures with taxes or international borrowing, the government
prefers the latter, because that allows the household to invest in domestic capital through banks
at a social return R′ that exceeds the world interest rate R¯.
This return differential motive hence provides an explanation for why many governments
systematically and heavily rely on international debt, which can not be explained by the
consumption-smoothing motive alone.28 It arguably constitutes an improvement in realism
over the previous literature on sovereign default, which for convenience usually abstracts from
capital and instead hardwires the borrowing motive into the government’s utility function by
assuming a low discount factor β relative to the inverse world interest rate q¯.29 In section 6 we
will see that the return differential motive delivers quantitatively reasonable predictions. More
importantly, as explained in the next subsection, allowing for an endogenous, time-varying
borrowing motive can explain why we observe post-default market exclusion.
The motive for the government to borrow internationally relies on the model’s feature that
the social return on investment is higher than the cost of international funds. In the model,
this is the result of a financial friction, that raises the social return of investment above the
private. This feature is in line with the literature on capital flows such as Gourinchas and
Jeanne (2013) and Benhima (2013), who argue that country specific “capital wedges” between
the private and social returns of investment can explain empirical cross-country differences in
27Namely, the domestic banks’ leverage constraint and partial integration into international capital markets.
28If consumption smoothing were the only motive for borrowing, it would (on average) call for precautionary
savings due to the endogenous borrowing limit resulting from the governments lack of commitment.
29With the time period being one quarter, Arellano (2008) uses a β of 0.953 and a net world interest rate
R¯ − 1 of 1.7%, which implies a q¯ = 0.983. Aguiar and Gopinath (2006) use β = 0.8 and R¯ − 1 = 1%. Mendoza
and Yue (2012) use β = 0.88 and R¯− 1 = 1%. Guimaraes (2011), Roldán-Peña (2012), Joo (2014), Gornemann
(2015), Gordon and Guerrón-Quintana (2017) and Park (2017) also consider a sovereign default models with
capital. All but one of them rely on similar parameter values for β and R¯ in order to motivate borrowing in
the long run. Guimaraes also considers an economy where the MPK is the only reason to borrow. However, he
restricts his attention to analytical results with numerical illustrations. Moreover, in his model this motive to
borrow vanishes as the domestic capital stock converges to its steady state level where MPK = R¯.
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borrow, the more default risk countries are willing to take. Micro evidence for financial frictions
that can explain these wedges has also been documented in the development literature. The
literature review in Banerjee and Duflo (2005) shows how especially in less developed countries
access to finance for private agents is often difficult and very expensive, much more than what
can reasonably be explained by default and intermediation costs.
Finally, consider the case of Greece, which I will calibrate the model to. Domestic bank
loans are the primary source of finance for Greek firms and loan rates paid by Greek firms
certainly exceeded those paid by the Greek sovereign substantially, the latter − prior to the
crisis − being virtually equal to the return on the German bonds, and close to deposit rates.
Further evidence for access to finance being particularly difficult for Greek firms can be found
in the ECB’s survey on the access to finance of enterprises. The fraction of small and medium
enterprises that name “access to finance” as their principal concern is roughly twice as large in
Greece as it is in the Euro zone as a whole since the start of the biannual survey in 2009; and
this difference has somewhat increased since the Greek default.
4.4 Endogenous exclusion from international capital markets
Having explained why the government usually borrows in this framework, let us next use the
simplified model to understand why after default the government may temporarily choose to
self-exclude itself from international capital markets. As mentioned above, the assumption that
the household does not invest directly (K ′H = 0) − case 1 − is valid in the full model for the
calibration chosen below for most of the ergodic distribution. However, in the full model large
losses of bank equity due to sovereign default may increase the endogenous spread so much
that direct investment becomes attractive to the household and he becomes the predominant
marginal investor. In that case the full model resembles case 2.
In case 2, when the household is the marginal investor, the marginal social return is lower
due to the household’s competitive disadvantage at allocating capital R′m = R′/(1 + ξ). If the
household’s disadvantage ξ is large enough, the marginal return of investment may be lower
than the cost of international funds R′m = R′/(1+ξ) < R¯, which makes international borrowing
undesirable by lemma 1 − even if R′ > R¯. In this situation the government hence chooses not
to issue any new debt. It self-excludes itself from international capital markets.
To sum up, the marginal return on domestic investment drops discretely once the households
technology is used for the marginal unit of investment. If it falls below the cost of international
funds, borrowing from abroad becomes undesirable. As we shall see in the next section, this
situation typically arises as a consequence of sovereign default in the full model for the chosen
calibration.
long run investment rates, while yielding similar private returns on investment across countries.
The wedges estimated in this literature tend to be higher for poorer countries, which also tend
to be riskier borrowers. This squares with the models predictions: The bigger the incentive to
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Through financial frictions, the model is hence able not only to explain why governments
borrow, and why default is costly (see next section), but it also provides an endogenous ex-
planation for exclusion from international capital markets. While other authors have provided
models that endogenize the output costs of default, they still rely on the assumption of exclu-
sion. In most cases such as Mendoza and Yue (2012), exclusion is actually necessary to generate
the output costs. This is the first model that can also account for exclusion endogenously.
Furthermore, this explanation for why we observe exclusion is based on a novel mecha-
nism. The argument behind the assumption of exclusion typically refers to some coordinated
punishment of the borrower by the lenders. Yet this argument has one weakness: as Kletzer
(1994) argues, it would be optimal for individual (small) lenders to deviate from this collective
punishment strategy.30 The explanation for exclusion proposed here is immune to such criti-
cism, because it is optimal for both sides not to trade. There is simply no price at which the
borrowing country and the lender would want to trade. At the same time both this and the
conventional theory are observationally equivalent.
5 Dissecting the mechanism numerically: The effects
and incentives of default
In this section I illustrate numerically how the borrowing motive and exclusion play out in
the full model in conjunction with the endogenous default choice of the government and the
associated default costs. For this purpose I first discuss the calibration and computation. Next
I relate the simple to the full model. Then I discuss the consequences and incentives to default
in the full model.
5.1 Calibration and Computation
Calibration. I calibrate the model to Greek data. As we have seen, the model describes a
small open economy whose government has access to international capital markets, with an
important domestic financial sector, no foreign investment into the private sector and without
the option to inflate away its debt. Greece satisfies this description to a large extent. First,
Greece is a small open economy with respect to both the EU and the world. Second, the
Greek government has borrowed extensively: the mean debt to GDP ratio for the post-Euro
pre-default period 2000-2010 is 111%.31 This debt was held both domestically (48%) as well
as abroad according to Bank of Greece data. Third, credit to the local economy is largely
supplied by the domestic banking sector and non-intermediated investment plays a minor role
(see e.g. Demirguc-Kunt and Levine (1999)). Similarly, domestic financial institutions account
30In the Greek crisis for example, it did not take long for rumors about Greece talking with Russia about
potential loans.
31Greece fixed its exchange rate to the Euro in 2000 and introduced currency in 2001.
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bailouts altogether, the bailouts that were implemented certainly did not go anywhere as far
as to compensate entirely for the consequences of default.32
The data on Greece used for the calibration and the model evaluation comes from several
sources discussed in appendix E, table 6. For GDP and its components and TFP I use annual
data covering the pre-default period 1980 to 2010, while for the financial variables the observa-
tion period is restricted to 2000 to 2010. This is both due to data availability and to account
for the structural change of accessing the Euro, which should have a stronger impact on these
variables. GDP, TFP and credit are expressed as deviation from a linear trend.33
Parameter Value Target/Explanation
α capital share 0.36 standard value
δ depreciation 0.14 21% investment/GDP
β discount factor 0.96 same as q¯
γ risk aversion 2 standard value
χ labor weight in utility 1.55 mean of labor = 1
ν inverse Frisch elasticity 0.5 standard value
G government expenditures 0.28 21% govt. consumption/GDP
θ financial constraint 0.7 28% equity ratio
η share of retained equity 0.803 6% deposit-loan spread
ψ share of bonds on balance sheet 0.14 14% exposure
ξ¯ average cost of direct investment 0.071 1.5 ppt increase of deposit-loan
spread in case of default, costs vary
2 ppt across the cycle
ξˆ dependence of cost of direct
investment on GDP
-0.45
q¯ inverse world interest rate 0.96 real rate Germany
ρ persistence of TFP shock 0.76 estimate
σ standard deviation of TFP shock 0.057 7.5% standard deviation of GDP
Table 2: Parameter values
32At the same time the model also fits other default episodes, such as the Argentinian 2001 crisis where
concerns regarding the damage to the financial sector also played a dominant role in the policy debate before
and after default. See Sosa-Padilla (2012), Perry and Serven (2003) and Kumhof (2004).
33Note that in doing so I follow Arellano (2008), who also uses a linear long-run trend, whereas many
other papers using emerging economy data use more flexible trends to focus on the business cycle frequency
fluctuations (e.g. Mendoza and Yue (2012), Aguiar and Gopinath (2006)). While these differences are relatively
unimportant for the much studied 2001 default of Argentina, they are significant for Greece, which experienced
a much more prolonged and deep downturn, which a medium-frequency filter would attribute to the trend.
Furthermore, using data only till 2010 to construct the trend, prevents the estimate of the trend to be affected
by the crisis.
for most of the domestically held sovereign debt (80% according to Bank of Greece data).
Fourth, private investment of foreigners in Greece play a minor role. As figure 7 shows in
appendix E, the net foreign asset position of Greece is dominated by government debt and
what little net private investment there is largely flows out of Greece rather than in. Fifth,
since the accession to the Euro zone, Greece can not inflate its debt away. The main difference
between the model and the Greek scenario probably is the policy response: Both Greek banks
as well as the government were to some extent bailed out. While the model abstracts from
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The calibration is summarized in table 2. As in the data the time period is one year. The
utility function features standard parameter values: The discount factor β is set to 0.96 while
the risk aversion coefficient γ is chosen to be 2. The labor weight χ is set to normalize the
mean of labor to 1, while ν is chosen to imply a Frisch elasticity of labor of 2, a common value
and within the range of estimates reported by Greenwood et al. (1988). The capital share α is
set to 36%. Depreciation δ is set such as to match the 21% average investment to GDP ratio
for Greece. G is chosen to match the average government consumption to GDP ratio of 21%.
34ξ moves from 6% to 8% as log TFP moves from 3.5 standard deviations above to 3.5 standard deviations
below the mean. I analyze the sensitivity to these two parameters below.
35As commonly found in the RBC literature (e.g. Cooley and Prescott (1995)), the estimated volatility of
TFP is too small for the model to explain observed volatilities. Hence, to capture the observed volatility of
output in a simple model with just one shock I scale up the estimate of σ.
The inverse world interest rate q¯ is set to 0.96, in line with the average real interest rate
for Germany for the period 1980 to 2010. While this choice might not seem very surprising,
setting β = q¯ is highly unusual in the context of quantitative models of sovereign default, which
usually assume β 
 q¯ in order to generate a motive for the government to borrow.
The choice of the financial sector parameters is the least straightforward. I choose these
values in order to match moments of financial variables for Greece. The dividend payout
parameter η is chosen to match an average spread between the loan and the deposit rate of
6%. This is in line with the average spread between 1 year deposits and firm loans for Greece.
The share of domestic bonds on banks balance sheets ψ is set to 14%, which is the mean
of the Greek credit institutions’ exposure to sovereign bonds in the Bank of Greece data. θ,
which determines the tightness of the banks’ leverage constraint, is set such as to yield a ratio
between the exposure to the government and equity of 54%, which is the reduction that Greece
banks book equity suffered during the period that the haircut was imposed, from 2011 to April
2012. This value implies an equity ratio of 26% percent, which is roughly in line with Gertler
and Kiyotaki (2010) and Gertler and Karadi (2011) and guarantees that sovereign default does
not drive the banks into default. Hence the higher-than-realistic equity ratio compensates for
the simplifying assumption that default is complete. Finally, the parameters that govern the
relative cost advantage of intermediated over direct investment ξ¯ and ξˆ are simultaneously
chosen such that ξ so as to match the 1.5ppt increase in the deposit-loan spread after default
observed in the Greek data and so as to guarantee that intermediate investment is marginally
more competitive than direct investment even for the highest values of TFP considered (given
the average deposit-loan spread). This implies that ξ varies only mildly.34
Finally, the persistence parameter of the TFP process ρ is estimated using detrended TFP
data, while the standard deviation σ is set such as to such as to match the standard deviation
of detrended GDP in the data.35
Computation. Given the high complexity of the model, only an approximate numerical
solution of the government’s problem (19) is feasible. I briefly summarize the computational
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36The general idea is to replace the full vector of endogenous pre-decision state variables (agents portfolios)
by a smaller vector of post-decision state variables (agents cash-at-hand). To get to the post-decision state
variable, one has to anticipate certain future decisions that depend on the pre-decision state space. Here, the
decision to be anticipated is tomorrow’s default decision, which hence becomes a choice variable today. This is
why it is convenient that evaluating expectations exactly yields a function that is continuous in the exogenous
state. This method, which is the second methodological innovation, is explained in the appendix and in its
general applicability in Thaler (2016)
using a time iteration algorithm, that jointly iterates on the policy and value functions
Solving the model poses some significant computational difficulties due to, first, the high
dimensionality of the state space and, second, the complexity of the government maximization
problem (19), which is a mathematical program with equilibrium constraints (MPEC). To
address the first problem, I use a novel variant of post-decision state variables that reduces
the computationally necessary state space.36 Furthermore, the use of smooth interpolation and
analytical integration allows the use of a low number of grid points. To solve the MPEC, I rely
on a modern, derivative-based maximization algorithm (KNITRO).
5.2 International borrowing in the full model
The simplified model in the previous section was useful to deliver the intuition behind why and
when governments borrow. But it left out some important elements of the full model, which
may alter the optimal borrowing choice. Let us sequentially add some of the missing elements
to the simple model to see how they affect the results.
First add uncertainty: Stochastic TFP now moves the domestic rates, in particular the
marginal social return on capital R′m. For the model to be able to rationalize substantial debt
in the long run, the condition R′m > R¯ must therefore hold in the ergodic distribution, not in
steady state. For small enough shocks the ergodic distribution will be concentrated around the
steady state. Therefore, if 1 + ξ 
 s 
 0 then the condition R′m > R¯ will hold for most of the
ergodic distribution.
Second, consider additionally limited commitment and endogenous default costs. Now the
government faces a soft borrowing constraint instead of a hard. However the logic of the simple
model summarized in lemma 1 still applies locally: As long as foreign debt is so low that the
approach here. In doing so, I highlight two computational innovations that were integrated in
the algorithm. The appendix provides more details.
Solving a DSGE model with continuous choice variables numerically typically requires the
uses of 3 tools: function approximation, numerical integration and numerical maximization. I
approximate the policy and value functions Z(Ω) by twice continuously differentiable functions
Z˜(Ω) over the whole state space (including exogenous states). Given these approximations, I
exactly evaluate the integrals contained in the expectations of future values of these functions,
such as E|Ω(Z ′) 
´∞
0 pdf(ω
′|Ω)Z˜(ω′|Ω)dω. This approach is novel and different from the
quadrature approaches, that are usually used to evaluate expectations. Finally, to find the sta-
tionary solution to the optimization problem of the government, I solve problem (19) recursively
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default probability is 0, the government will want to borrow more if R′m > R¯ . As soon as a
default premium arises, the government will have to trade off the benefits of borrowing not just
against the cost of funds, but also against the expected cost of default. It will optimally choose
a debt level such that the default probability is positive but not too high.
Finally, the simplified model misses some other features that affect the optimal choice of
the government to borrow. Therefore the optimality condition from the lemma 1, “borrow
if R′m > R¯”, which for low s was an approximation even in the simplified model, holds only
approximately in the full model. Nevertheless, as figure 2 shows this approximation does a
good job for my calibration. It hence is useful to deliver the intuition for the borrowing motive.
The two conditional histograms in figure 2 show how R′m compares to R¯ in the ergodic
distribution of the calibrated model. The left histogram shows the density function of R′m con-
ditional on the government not borrowing from abroad, while the right histogram is conditional
on the government borrowing (BX > 0). Note that borrowing is optimal most of the time, the
unconditional probability is p(BX > 0) = 96%. Furthermore, as the right panel shows, the
government borrows almost only when R′m > R¯ holds, in line with lemma 1. Conversely, as can
be seen in the left panel, the government typically does not borrow when R′m < R¯. However
there are a few periods, where the government does not borrow even though the marginal return
on investment is above the world interest rate.
This can be due to two reasons. First, recall that in the previous section for KH = 0 we
approximated Rˆ′1 ≈ R¯ even though Rˆ′1 > R¯. Second, in the simple model we ignored that
the spread s is endogenous. Taking this into account gives rise to an additional distributional
motive. Even if international borrowing is “profitable” on a aggregate level, it redistributes
wealth away from the banks by reducing the loan rate R′. This makes the borrowing constraint
bind tighter in the future, which may be enough to make foreign borrowing undesirable even if
R′m − R¯ is positive but small.
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Figure 2: The government’s borrowing choice. The figure reports the distribution of the
expected risk adjusted marginal return of investment R′m in the ergodic distribution of the
calibrated model, conditional on the government’s borrowing choice B′X being 0 or positive.
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tightly (see panel b for the corresponding multiplier λ1). As a consequence, banks have to
reduce the size of their balance sheets, and hence the amount of loans they extend (pan. c) and
the amount of deposits they raise. At the same time the tightening of the leverage constraint
is reflected in the deposit-loan spread, which jumps up to the maximum given by ξr (pan. d).
At this high level of the spread, direct investment, which was unprofitable before t = 0 due to
the lower capital allocation efficiency of the household, becomes profitable for the household.
Due to these costs however, the shift to direct financing can only partially compensate the
reduction in bank financing and total loans, i.e. total capital drops (pan. c). At the same time,
the household decreases his consumption and, after a small initial increase, his labor supply
(pan. e and f).37
Since capital drops and labor does not fully compensate, output falls (pan. h). Notice that
the drop in output is persistent and v-shaped. The output costs of default increase for the first
years. This is so because underinvestment decreases the capital stock gradually for a number
of periods (pan. c). Output follows a similar pattern. This feature can help to explain the
5.3 The costs of default
Having understood the intuition behind the motive to borrow internationally and how it po-
tentially can turn around and become a motive not to borrow, we are now ready to analyze the
consequences of default in the full model. As I stressed before, the model assumes no direct
costs of default, neither the typical output costs, nor exclusion. But this does not mean that
default is costless. On the contrary, the model predicts seizable and long lasting costs of default.
Figure 3 illustrates the consequences of default. Before t = 0 the economy rests at its
risk adjusted steady state, in which the government has substantial foreign liabilities. Default
occurs unexpectedly at t = 0. The graph shows how the economy evolves back to the steady
state in the absence of further shocks. Note that this default event does not reflect optimal
behavior by the government, but merely serves to illustrate the pure costs of default, absent
changes of TFP. Typical (i.e. optimal) default episodes are analyzed in the section 6.
Since banks are exposed to sovereign debt, upon default in t = 0 they loose a significant
fraction of their equity (panel a). This implies that the leverage constraint now binds more
sluggishness of the recovery of GDP after default observed for many countries.38
In the periods following default, banks slowly recapitalize by accumulating the profits gen-
erated by the higher spread on their lending activity (pan. b and d). As they do so, they
expand their balance sheet once again, and more and more of the direct investment is replaced
by intermediated investment (pan. c). The economy slowly converges back.
37Note that labor moves little relative to capital. The path of labor largely reflects the path of capital (and
hence the wage) which drops until year 9 and then recovers quickly until year 11 because banks are marginal
investors again.
38In models with exogenous output costs of default such as Arellano (2008) the costs usually are a increasing
function of output. Since default is typically triggered by a negative shock, the output costs of default also
increase over time after a typical default event. Note however that in my model the costs increase even
independently of TFP.
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Figure 3: Post default dynamics: Equity, total loans, labor, output and consumption are
normalized by their respective steady state values. Direct and bank loans are fractions of total
loans. The black line in panel 9 marks the world interest rate R¯. The non-smoothness of the
responses is the result of the occasionally binding constraints switching on and off in this non-
stochastic simulation: The first jump at t = 0 is associated to the default event, the second at
t = 8 to BX ≥ 0 stopping and KH ≥ 0 starting to bind, the third at t = 10 to the endogenous
borrowing limit starting to bind (i.e. the default probability becoming positive).
39As figure 2 showed exclusion may last a little longer or shorter, since lemma 1 holds only approximately.
Panel h) shows the government’s optimal foreign debt choice. After default has wiped out
all foreign debt, the government does not borrow any new funds abroad. This is so, because the
banks’ losses drive up the deposit-loan spread (pan. d) such that the household becomes the
marginal investor and the marginal return of investment R′m hence drops (pan. i). Since R′m
drops below the world interest rate, by lemma 1 borrowing is no longer desirable. R′m remains
depressed for several years, until it jumps back up once banks have re-accumulated enough
equity to become marginal investors again (KH = 0). That is when the government reaccesses
international capital markets, in line with lemma 1.39
The model hence predicts that the government “self-excludes” itself from the market for a
period of several years. The duration of this period is endogenous and depends on the time it
takes for the marginal return on investment to recover, which in turn depends on the how long
it takes for banks to recover a sufficient level of equity.
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Figure 4 illustrates the default set for the calibrated model. Panel a) illustrates proposition
2: Higher levels of foreign debt BX increase the incentives to default.
Furthermore, panel a) illustrates an additional quantitative feature of the default set, which
was found to be robust in numerical experiments: lower levels of TFP ω make default more
likely.42 This is so because TFP affects the aggregate resources of the economy and the expected
optimal for higher levels of foreign debt, ceteris paribus. I.e. the default set is bounded below
with respect to BX . This is so because the benefit of defaulting increases in foreign debt, but
the costs remain unchanged.
Proposition 3 Assume that Ω1 = [ω,K,D,BB, KB, R,BX ] ∈ D. Assume additionally that
the government can transfer Z ≥ 0 of the bank’s equity to the household in a lump sum fashion,
but not the other way around. Then the following holds:
Ω3 =
[
ω,K, Dˆ, BˆB, KB, R,BX
]
∈ D if BˆB ≤ BB and BB − D = BˆB − Dˆ.
Proposition 3 states that lower levels of sovereign exposure of the bank, keeping constant
pre-dividend equity in case of repayment, make default more attractive. This is intuitive, given
that the post default equity of the bank decreases in the bank’s deposit financed exposure.41
5.4 Default incentives
In equilibrium all agents, including the government, correctly anticipate the consequences of
default just discussed: They understand that defaulting on foreigners per se is a free lunch.
But they also understand that defaulting on local banks causes a financial crisis. Therefore
the government ex post optimally repays all outstanding debt whenever the costs of default
outweigh the benefits. This makes external debt sustainable ex ante. The financial vulnerability
of the economy essentially serves as a commitment device for a government that cannot commit
otherwise.40
To understand what the default decision depends on, it is useful to define the default set as
those states where the government defaults in equilibrium: D = {Ω ∈ Ω : Rep(Ω) = 0}. This
default set has a number of features that resonate similar findings in Eaton and Gersovitz
(1981) and Arellano (2008). We start with two analytical results proven in appendix C:
Proposition 2 Assume that Ω1 = [ω,K,D,BB, KB, R,BX ] ∈ D. Then the following holds:
Ω2 =
[
ω,KH , D,BB, KB, R, BˆX
]
∈ D if BˆX ≥ BX .
Proposition 2 says that if default is optimal for a given level of foreign debt BX , it must be
41The additional assumption necessary to proof proposition 3 does not change the equilibrium of the economy,
if the value function of the government is decreasing in the share of total resources held by the bank, because
then Z∗ = 0. I find that, for the calibrated model, in equilibrium the value function indeed satisfies this
condition across the whole state space.
42As the appendix shows, the numerical solution algorithm is based on the guess that part 1 holds. This
guess is verified ex post at each grid point.
40Notice that this entails another externality: Banks do not get remunerated for the value of the commitment
that their investment in bonds entails.
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Figure 4: Default Set: The blue area is the default region, the yellow area is the repayment
region. The white area is outside the ergodic distribution and hence off the grid. In each panel,
the remaining states are set to their non-stochastic risk-adjusted steady state values, which
are indicated by the black dot. The levels of foreign and domestic debt are normalized by the
output at the non-stochastic risk adjusted steady state. The equity ratio on the x-axis in panel
b) is function of all state variables: It refers to the banks’ pre-dividend equity ratio conditional
on repayment: (RKB + BB − D)/(RKB + BB).
return on capital positively. When TFP is high optimal savings are therefore higher than
when TFP is low. Thus, bank equity, which is not affected by TFP and which is needed to
intermediate savings, is less scarce at lower levels of TFP. Hence, the loss of bank equity due
to sovereign default is less costly at lower TFP levels. At the same time, marginal utility and
therefore the benefit of not repaying foreign debt BX is higher when TFP is low.43 Figure 8 in
the appendix illustrates how the costs and benefits depend on default in more detail. Notice,
that together with the borrowing motive and the commitment value of default, this feature
guarantees that default happens along the equilibrium path.
Panel b) illustrates another numerically robust feature: Default is more attractive when
the banks are better capitalized, keeping constant the total capital stock KB + KH , domestic
bond-holdings BB and foreign sovereign bond-holdings BX .44 This is because, on the one hand,
default is less distortionary and hence less costly when banks are better capitalized. To see this
consider a situation where banks are so well capitalized that the leverage constraint is slack, even
after default. The current deposit-loan spread would hence be zero and would not be affected
by default. Neither would the current size of the banks balance sheet be affected. Compare
this to a situation where banks are less well capitalized such that the leverage constraint binds
even under repayment. In this situation default would increase the current deposit-loan spread
43This feature is common: In Arellano (2008) countries also default in bad times, when resources are scarce
and the costs of default are assumed to be low.
44Given these restrictions, higher bank equity may result either from a higher loan rate R, lower deposit
liabilities D or a higher share of bank loans KB .
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and/or force banks to reduce their balance sheets. On the other hand, the benefits of default
increase as banks are better capitalized, since well capitalized banks allow a less distorted
allocation of the resources not paid to the foreigners BX .
Panel c) illustrates that the default incentives increase in the amount of foreign debt (again
proposition 1) but decrease in the amount of domestic debt. This illustrates the disciplining
role of domestic debt: the more exposed the domestic sector is, the more foreign debt will be
repaid. Note that in panel c) deposits D are kept constant. That means the domestic debt
along the y-axis is equity financed. So the graph illustrates that for the calibrated model default
incentives increase also in equity financed debt (proposition 3 referred to deposit financed debt).
6 Quantitative performance
This section assesses the model’s quantitative performance in terms of business cycle moments
and the patterns observed around default episodes.
6.1 Cyclical moments
Table 3 reports the most important business cycle moments of the model and compares them
to their empirical counterparts in Greek data.
The data used to generate the empirical moments has been discussed before, with the
exception of the default frequency. This frequency is difficult to measure since default is a
rare event. If one considers the longest possible observation period, that is since Greece’s
independence in 1829, there have been 5 default events: The 4 reported by Reinhart and
45The initial observations are discarded. The trade balance and the spread are not normalized. Episodes
where another default happened in the 31 years prior to the default are excluded.
46Low debt levels are common in models with 1-period debt. As Chatterjee and Eyigungor (2012) and
Hatchondo and Martinez (2009) show, more realistic ratios can be obtained with long term debt, an extension
beyond the scope of this paper for computational reasons.
Rogoff (2008) in 1843, 1860, 1893, 1932 plus the recent crisis. This yields an annual default
frequency of 2.7%. Yet, this estimate is based on the assumption that the underlying economy
has not changed over time. This is hardly the case. According to my model for example, the
development of a financial sector arguably has made default more costly. Therefore I consider
this estimate an upper bound for the default frequency at best.
The model’s moments are obtained from 100,000 periods of simulated data. The full sample
is used to calculate the default frequency. Mimicking the treatment of the real data, I then take
pre-default subsamples of 31 periods, normalize them by their mean and calculate the respective
moments for each pre-default episode.45 Table 3 reports the means of these moments. Notice
that, with the exception of the output volatility, none of these moments were targeted.
Focus first on the default-related moments. The model predicts a total debt to GDP ratio
of 44% and a foreign debt to GDP ratio of 18%. While these values are less than half of
their empirical counterparts,46 the model makes reasonable predictions about the share of
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domestically held debt: It predicts 59% of domestic debt, while this number is 47% in the
data. Since the model feature risk neutral lenders, the default frequency and the mean of the
sovereign spread, by construction, almost coincide.47 In fact the model matches the spread
very well, which implies that the predicted default frequency is much lower than the “historical
upper bound estimate”. Furthermore, the model yields a negative correlation between GDP
and the spread. This not only is in line with the Greek data, but is robust feature generally
found in studies of sovereign debt (see e.g. Mendoza and Yue (2012)). At the same time the
model underestimates the volatility of the spreads. The magnitude of the volatility of the debt
to GDP ratio lies in the ballpark of what is measured in the data.
These results are interesting for three reasons. First, the debt to GDP ratios are higher much
than the numbers found usually in the literature. For example, Arellano (2008) and Mendoza
and Yue (2012) obtain 1.5% and 5.75% foreign debt to annual GDP.48 Second because the
model allows to distinguish between foreign and domestically held debt. Third, because they
result from the novel borrowing motive: In the two aforementioned papers the reason for the
country to borrow so much as to risk default is the exogenous difference in its time preference
relative to the rest of the world 1/β −1/q¯ of 14% and 64% annually. Contrarily, the calibration
I chose features β = q¯. The country instead borrows because of an endogenous (time-varying)
difference between the domestic return on capital and the world rate R′−1/q¯ of 6% (on average).
The magnitude of this spread is much lower than the difference in time preferences commonly
used and, unlike the latter, is disciplined by the measured deposit-loan spread.
Besides, the model preserves the typical features of the real business cycle model: As in
47The following relationship holds spread = P (Rep=0)1−P (Rep=0)
1
q¯ , which for q¯ and (1 − P (Rep = 0)) close to 1 can
be approximated as spread  P (Rep = 0). Furthermore, the default frequency refers to the whole sample and
the spread to pre-default periods.
48Or 6% and 23% debt to quarterly GDP. However, they are also targeting higher default frequencies.
the data, consumption is slightly less volatile and investment significantly more volatile than
output. Moreover, the model matches the data well in predicting a very high correlation between
consumption and GDP, and a somewhat lower correlation between investment and output.
Furthermore the model predicts a trade balance that is about as volatile and uncorrelated to
GDP as in the data.
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Moment Data Model
Means
E(B¯/Y ) Total debt to GDP ratio 121% 44%
E(BX/Y ) Foreign debt to GDP ratio 51% 18%
E(BX/B¯) Share of domestic debt 47% 59%
E(spread) Sovereign spread 0.48% 0.50%
E(Rep) Default frequency < 2.7% 0.44%
Volatilities
σ(Y ) GDP 7.5% 7.4%
σ(B¯/Y ) Total debt to GDP ratio 12.3% 9.8%
σ(TB) Trade balance 3.7% 2.9%
σ(spread) Sovereign spread 0.55% 0.26%
σ(C)/σ(Y ) Relative consumption volatility 71% 83%
σ(I)/σ(Y ) Relative investment volatility 226% 310%
Correlations of GDP with
corr(Y,C) Consumption 96% 93%
corr(Y, I) Investment 91% 80%
corr(Y, spread) Sovereign spread -28% -70%
corr(Y, TB) Trade balance 12% -1%
Table 3: Cyclical moments
6.2 Default episodes
Next I study the model’s dynamics around defaults using event study techniques. Similarly
as before, I extract the period starting 5 years before default and ending 25 years after from
the simulated data and normalize these values by their respective means. Figure 5 plots the
median of the evolution of each variable. To highlight the stochastic properties of these paths,
their 10th to 90th percentiles are also plotted. The figure furthermore shows the evolution of
the respective variables in the data. The default period 0 corresponds to 2011 for the data.49
GDP values beyond 2016 are IMF forecasts.
Several features are worth noticing. First, in line with two stylized facts documented by
Mendoza and Yue (2012) the model predicts that default happens in bad times: On the one
49The default of Greece was a somewhat gradual process. While Greece effectively had lost access to capital
markets by the end of 2010, Greek banks registered their first losses on sovereign bonds in August 2011 when
they participated in the securities exchange program. The process of debt restructuring was finished in April
2012.
hand, prior to default output is below trend 2/3 of the time and default itself is associated with
a strong drop in GDP. On the other hand, prior to default the external debt ratio is above
average and peaks in the default period. Second, the magnitude of the output drop associated
with default predicted by the model coincides with the what we observed in Greece, where
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GDP dropped by a quarter after default. Third, the model predicts a credit crunch: Bank
loans drop, the spread between the deposit and loan rate (not shown) spikes and direct lending
as an imperfect substitute can only partially compensate for the loss of intermediated funding,
such that total capital drops for a number of periods. Again, the magnitudes predicted by the
model are similar to what we observe in the data. Fourth, while the model understates the
magnitude of the drop in consumption, it does a fairly good job with respect to investment.
Fifth, the responses predicted by the model are less protracted than what we observe in Greece,
despite the fact, that the output costs increase over time (recall figure 3). This divergence is
explained by the relatively quick reversal of TFP and the absence of adjustment costs in the
model and the linear detrending applied to the data.
Most importantly, the model predicts that default is followed by a period of several years,
during which the government does not issue any new debt. Unlike in existing models of sovereign
default, this is an equilibrium outcome. The average duration of this period is 5.8 years, which
is close to the values usually assumed in the default literature. Greece made its return to
international capital markets in 2017, 6 years after the start of the episode in 2011. Furthermore,
the prediction of the model is well within the range of 1 to 8 years estimated in Gelos et al.
(2011), Richmond and Dias (2009) and Cruces and Trebesch (2013). Furthermore, note that
the endogenous duration of exclusion is stochastic. As panel a) of figure 6 shows, its distribution
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Figure 5: Default episodes: This figure plots the median of the simulated path of key
variables around default events (black solid line). Furthermore the 10th to 90th percentiles are
plotted in blue. The black dotted line corresponds to the evolution of the variable in Greek
data. Default occurs at period 0.
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Figure 6: Length of default episodes and credit to GDP around reaccess: Panel a):
The bar histogram refers to the model. The distribution function, which uses bigger bins, is
copied from Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2017), figure 13.1. Panel b): The red line reproduces
the estimates of credit to GDP from figure 1, with the corresponding 90 and 95% confidence
intervals in gray. The green line shows the same estimates for simulated data.
Furthermore, the model predicts a pattern of credit to GDP around exit that is similar to
that documented for the data in section 1.1. This can be seen in panel b) of figure 6, which com-
pares the path of credit to GDP in the model and in the data using the event analysis approach
from section 1.1.52 Exclusion periods end after the financial sector’s conditions measured by
credit over GDP have substantially recovered.53
50I consider a country to have re-accessed capital markets if it borrows for two consecutive periods. This way,
the exclusion periods include a few episodes where the government interrupts its no-borrowing period for one
period due to one or several unusually large shocks.
51A caveat: Existing studies differ in their definitions of the beginning and the end of a default episode.
Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2017) report the duration until settlement, not until market reaccess. Combining
their data to date entry into default and Cruces and Trebesch (2013) to date reaccess to the markets and
restricting the set to the more developed countries leaves us with only 38 episodes and yields a median of 9 and
a mean of 7.5. Gelos et al. (2011) measure the time from default to reaccess and report a mean of 4.7 and a
median of 3.5 period across 45 default episodes. While average durations differ across studies, the skewness of
their distribution is a robust feature.
52To generate a comparable sample of simulated data, I treated each default episode in my long simulation
as a different country. For each such “country” I kept a sample that is 4 times as long as the average default
episode, randomly selecting a time window around the default episode.
53However, unlike in the data, in the model the recovery of credit to GDP is not yet complete at time of
reaccess. This is because reaccess happens around the time that banks become the marginal investors. At
this time bank equity has largely but not yet fully recovered. This implies that the deposit-loan spread is still
elevated relative to normal times, causing an elevated loan rate and hence an elevated MPK in turn. A higher
MPK means a lower capita/output and therefore loan/output ratio.
is strongly skewed to the right, with a mean of 5.8 and a median of 4 years.50 This property of
the model is in accordance with empirical observations: Using a sample of 147 defaults since
1975 Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2017) report a mean duration of default of 8 and a median
of 5 years. However, their sample contains a lot of developing countries. Constraining the
sample to the 50% more financially developed countries according to the financial institutions
development index proposed by Svirydzenka (2016) reduces these values to 3 and 6.51
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6.3 Robustness
The results are robust to a number of modeling changes. The exact shape of the financial friction
for example does not influence the mechanism of the model significantly.54 Furthermore, the
main results are qualitatively robust to using GHH preferences or abstracting from labor all
together. Using government spending shocks yields similar results as well.
Likewise, most of the conventional parameters have relatively little quantitative effect on
the default-related moments of the model. This is in particular true for the parameters of the
instantaneous utility function, the production function and government spending. However,
making the household impatient relative to the world interest rate, as the literature routinely
does, yields significantly higher default rates.
The financial sector parameters play a more important role, since they determine the costs
of default. The intensity of the financial friction θ determines the leverage of banks. The
higher the leverage, the higher the costs of default and hence the amount of sustainable debt.
The dividend payout parameter η pins down the spread between the bank lending and the
deposit rate. The higher the spread, the higher the difference between the steady state return
on domestic capital and the world rate, hence the stronger the incentive for the government to
borrow − more and at higher risk.
The cost advantage of intermediated investment ξ has an ambiguous effect on the default
incentives. For simplicity consider first the case that ξ is constant, i.e. ξˆ = 0. A lower cost
advantage of intermediation ξ¯ has two effects: First, it lowers the social cost of scarcity of
equity, second it lowers the maximum spread that banks can charge. The first effect makes
default less costly, the second however makes default more costly because it slows down the
re-accumulation of equity after default. For the chosen calibration the second effect is found to
dominate the first (locally): lowering ξ¯ marginally lengthens the exclusion period and increases
the sustainable amount of debt. In the extreme case of ξ¯ = 0 however, banks become obsolete
and no debt is sustainable. The other extreme, ξ¯ = ∞, means shutting down direct investment.
In that case upon default the economy experiences a very strong and very short financial crisis,
during which the deposit-loan spread shoots up to empirically implausible levels, which allows
the bank to recapitalize almost fully within one period. The cost of this strong but short crisis
is much smaller than the cumulative cost of the protracted crisis resulting from the chosen
intermediate value of ξ¯. Hence, the amount of debt sustainable is lower. Allowing ξ to move
inversely with TFP (ξˆ < 0) makes sovereign default more attractive in bad times relative to
good times, and hence slightly increases the default probability (by 0.1 ppt) and the debt to
54In my model, banks leverage is constraint by the collateral value of their assets as in Kiyotaki and Moore
(1997). Alternatively, I could have assumed a simple leverage constraint d′/r ≤ θ(k′ + qb′) or a state dependent
leverage constraint E|Ω [V ′B ] ≥ θ(k′ + q′b) as in Gertler and Kiyotaki (2010). These three different constraints
have slightly different implications: For a simple leverage constraint maximum leverage is constant. For the
Kiyotaki and Moore constraint, the higher today’s deposit-loan spread, the higher the collateral value, the
higher maximal leverage. The Gertler and Kiyotaki constraint extends this to the infinite future: the higher
the discounted value of all future profits, the higher maximal leverage. Said differently, the first constrains the
book-value leverage, the third the market-value leverage, and the second lies in between.
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exposure ψ, is discussed next.
7 Policy application: The EU plan to reduce the expo-
sure of banks to domestic sovereign debt
In the aftermath of the sovereign debt crisis, policy makers in the EU are discussing new rules
to weaken the sovereign-bank nexus. One proposal being discussed is to limit the exposure
of banks to domestic sovereign debt through various measures like ceilings or higher capital
requirements on domestic sovereign exposure.55 The intention of this proposal is to reduce the
risk of a “diabolic loop”, in which problems of sovereign debt sustainability lead to losses for
banks, which in turn affect government revenues negatively or generate additional expenditures
due to bailouts, hence making the sovereign debt burden even more unsustainable.
Yet, looking at this proposal through the lens of this model, such a reform may have
unintended consequences: Reducing banks’ to domestic sovereign debt, ceteris paribus, reduces
the cost of default for the domestic economy. This has two implications. First, default will
be more attractive ex post. Changing the rules from one day to the other may hence trigger
sovereign defaults that would otherwise not have occurred. Second, the anticipation of lower
default costs by international lenders ex ante means that governments will not be able to borrow
as much as before. Hence, the benefits derived from international lending will shrink.56 While
the second implication resembles the reasoning in the theoretical analysis of Chari et al. (2016),
the first is absent in their deterministic model.57
To illustrate these consequences quantitatively, I analyze the effects of a reduction of the
banks exposure to sovereign debt ψ by 20%. Table 4 shows the long run effects of this change:
As as the banks exposure is reduced by 20%, the total debt to GDP ratio drops by one third
and the foreign debt ratio by half. The effect of ψ on the debt capacity is highly nonlinear and
has a significant utility cost of about 0.9% in consumption equivalent, since foreign lending is
desirable. Note the importance of the borrowing motive for this welfare result: If the country
were to borrow because of impatience instead, a reduction in its debt capacity would imply an
increase in long run welfare.
55See for example Brunnermeier et al. (2016) or “Sovereign debt rule changes threaten EU bank finances”,
Financial Times, 8.6.2016
56In the policy discussion it is sometimes argued that the reduced demand for government bonds by domestic
banks may increase the interest rates of sovereign bonds as an unintended side effect. Yet this argument is
simply based on lower demand, while the argument made here is based on the lower commitment value. In fact
the model abstracts from the demand argument altogether, since foreign demand is perfectly elastic.
57In their setup default is discriminatory and borrowing from banks is directly desirable for tax smoothing
motives. In contrast, in my model default is non-discriminatory, and borrowing from banks is desirable indirectly
because it generates commitment to borrow from international lenders at the (favorable) world interest rate.
Furthermore their setup differs from the experiment here, in that they consider the exposure of banks a policy
variable that can be adjusted each period.
good times, and hence slightly increases the default probability (by 0.1 ppt) and the debt to
GDP ratio (by 1pt) and the exclusion time (1 period). The parameter governing the banks
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The short run effect is equally stark: Assume the country finds itself at the non-stochastic
risk adjusted steady state of the baseline economy at the end of period t. Assume furthermore
that between periods t and t + 1 ψ is changed unexpectedly, effective as of next period. Then
there is a 10% probability that TFP turns out so bad that the government will default at
the beginning of t + 1 because it can only partially roll over its outstanding foreign debt and
prefers default to the tax hike otherwise needed. If we assume instead that the regulatory
change is effective at the end of t,58 the effect is even more striking: After the sudden change,
the government not only is incapable of rolling over its debt, but also finds its banks less
exposed. It will default with 86% probability. While these sudden change scenarios are arguably
too stylized, they exemplify the point that a gradual implementation of the reform is to be
recommended, if the default probability along the transition to the lower ψ is to be contained.
8 Conclusion
Motivated by the recent European sovereign debt crisis, this paper proposes a unified theory
which explains why countries want and are able to borrow so much as to risk default, and
why default episodes are associated with financial crisis, output drops and exclusion from
international markets, and when countries return to markets after default.
To this end I develop a model of sovereign debt under limited commitment, with inter-
national lenders and an explicitly modeled domestic economy, which consists of households,
banks and firms. Savings are intermediated from households to firms by banks. Since there is a
friction in the intermediation process, which makes bank equity both necessary and scarce, the
economy never reaches its optimal level of investment. This fact generates a strong incentive for
the government to borrow on international markets. While the government can always default,
the fact that domestic banks are also exposed to sovereign debt generates commitment: If the
government chooses to default, banks suffer losses, which leads to a period of credit shortage.
58Assume that 20% of the government debt on the domestic bank’s balance sheet is forced to be sold to the
household.
Moment Baseline ψ-20%
E(B¯/Y ) Total debt to GDP ratio 43% 29%
E(BX/Y ) Foreign debt to GDP ratio 18% 9%
E(BX/B¯) Share of domestic debt 60% 69%
E(spread) Sovereign spread 0.47% 0.65%
E(Rep) Default frequency 0.44% 0.62%
E(V ) Welfare in lifetime. cons. equ. 100% 99.1%
Table 4: Effect of reduction of exposure
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Conceptually, this paper therefore contributes to the existing literature in three ways. First,
it introduces the return differential motive for borrowing into the sovereign debt literature.
Second, it proposes a new mechanism to explain the output costs of default, reflecting recent
experiences with the sovereign-bank nexus. Third, it proposes a novel explanation for why we
observe temporary breakdowns of international borrowing in the aftermath of default and for
how long this period lasts, two questions which the theoretical literature has not addressed
before.
Quantitatively I show that the model calibrated to other moments predicts empirically
plausible magnitudes of the consequences of default: Both the drop in output, investment and
credit as well as the duration of market shutdown are roughly in line with the data. Moreover
the model offers insights that are relevant for a current policy debate on reducing banks exposure
to domestic sovereign debt. I show that any such policy not only makes banks more resilient
against sovereign debt crisis, which would be desirable per se. It also reduces the sustainability
of sovereign debt, which is undesirable, at least in the context of the model.
Furthermore this model also contributes an explanation to why some countries like Japan or
Italy seem to be able to sustain debt to GDP ratios that are higher than what other countries
can sustain. It suggests that countries which have a higher share of domestically held debt
and which have more leveraged financial sectors would suffer more in case of default and are
hence less likely to renege on their obligations. The same argument may apply over time: The
development of leveraged financial sectors across the developed world may explain the increase
of debt to GDP ratios in the post war period.
This translates into a reduced capital stock and output losses. Furthermore, while the finan-
cial crisis lasts, the domestic return on investment drops, which discourages the government
to borrow. Hence default is followed not only by a period of depressed output, but also by a
period during which the government issues no new bonds. These two consequences of default
arise endogenously and make a limited amount of debt sustainable.
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Online-Appendix
Appendix A: The optimization problem of the government
Be X the vector of private sector variables X = [C,L,D′, K ′H , K ′B, B′B, B′X , K ′F , r, q, R′,W, λ1, λ2, λ3, λH ].
Then the government’s problem, after substituting out some variables (HH value function, to-
morrow’s labor supply and dividend), expressing the foreign bond demand as a complementarity
constraint and dropping a few redundant indices, is:
VG(Ω) = maxRep,T,B¯′,X
C1−γ
1 − γ + χ
L1+ν
1 + ν + βE [V
′
G]
s.t.
Government budget constraint
qB′T + T = BTRep + G
B′X ≥ 0
Bank FOCs
0 = C−γ/r − βE [V ′B e] − λ1E
[
C ′−γ
]
+ λ2/r
0 = −qC−γ + βE [Rep′V ′B e] + λ1E
[
Rep′C ′−γ
]
θ − λ2q + λ3q(1 − ψ)
0 = −C−γ + βR′E [V ′B e] + λ1R′E
[
C ′−γ
]
θ − λ2 − λ3ψ
0 = min
{
E
[
C ′−γθ(Rep′ B′B + R′ K ′B)
]
− E
[
C ′−γD′
]
, λ1
}
0 = min {η (RKB + RepBB − D) − qB′B − K ′B + D′/r , λ2}
0 = min {qB′B − (qB′B + K ′B)ψ , λ3}
Household FOCs
C−γ = βrE
[
C ′−γ
]
C−γ = βR/(1 + ξ)E
[
C ′−γ
]
+ λh
0 = min {λh , K ′H}
C−γW = χLν
Firm FOC
R′ = E
[(
C ′−γω′
) 1−α
ν+α+1 αK ′α−1F [(1 − α)K ′αF /χ]
1−α
ν+α
]
/E [C ′γ] + (1 − δ)
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W =
[
ω(1 − α)KαFL−α
]
Foreign lenders’ bond demand
0 = min {q − E [Rep′] q¯ , B′X}
Market clearing
B′T = B′B + B′X
K ′F = K ′B + K ′H
Resource constraint
C + K ′B + K ′H(1 + ξ) + B′Bq = B′T q + ωKF αL1−α + (1 − δ)KF − BTRep + BB − G
Notice that in this problem, the government not only needs to form expectations over
tomorrows value function V ′G, but also over the marginal utility of consumption uc(C ′) = C ′−γ,
the marginal value of bank equity V ′B e = C ′−γ + ηλ′2 , the repayment choice Rep′ and products
thereof.
Appendix B: Computation
State space reduction:
The (pre-decision) state space of the model described above is 7 dimensional Ω =
[
ω, B¯,KH , D,BB, KB, R
]
.
To reduce the computational burden it us helpful to reduce its dimensionality. This can be done
using post-decision state variables, i.e. by anticipating the default decision. In the following
I will explain this trick, which is an application of the method explained in Thaler (2016), in
two steps.
First assume that for a given state Ω we know the default optimal decision. In that case, we
can compute cash-at-hand (or pre-dividend equity) of the bank after debt repayment directly
from the information contained in Ω:
E ≡ RKB + RepBB − D
Cash-at-hand for the household, after debt repayment (but before receiving the proceedings of
new debt issuance) is given by the difference of the total resources of the economy minus bank
equity:
W = ω (KB + KH)α L1−α + (1 − δ) (KB + KH) − Rep(BT − BB) − G − E
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This variable contains the non-predetermined choice L though.59 Therefore, we need to keep
track separately of
KF = KB + KH
and
B˜ = Rep (BT − BB)
Once we know the three variables
[
E, B˜,KF
]
, plus the exogenous state ω, we have sufficient
information to solve the governments problem for all variables other than Rep, that is we can
find (T, B¯′, X).60 Call this alternative “state vector”
[
ω, Ω˜
]
=
[
ω,
[
E,KF , B˜
]]
. Assume we
solve the governments problem across this alternate state vector.
But what about the repayment decision, which after all depends on all the 7 state variables
in Ω? This bring us to step two. Whenever we solve for (T, B¯′, X) given the state
[
ω, Ω˜
]
,
we determine the values of all the endogenous elements in Ω. That means, we can deter-
mine the value of tomorrow’s endogenous alternative state conditional on repayment: Ω˜′|Rep′.
Furthermore assume that for each (BT , KH , D,BB, KB, R) there exists a threshold level of the
exogenous shock ω¯, below which default is optimal and above which repayment is optimal. (This
assumption is verified ex post.) Once we know this threshold value ω¯, we can determine tomor-
row’s endogenous state as a function of the exogenous state: Ω˜′(ω′) =
[
E ′(ω′), B˜(ω′), K ′F
]
.
This is all we need to know in order to compute the expectations over future variables,
given we have approximated them across the state
[
ω, Ω˜
]
. Finally, we need to ensure that
we picked the right ω¯. We know that at ω¯ the government must be indifferent between de-
fault and repayment, i.e. V
(
ω¯, Ω˜|Rep′ = 1
)
=V
(
ω¯, Ω˜|Rep′ = 0
)
. To find this threshold level,
we therefore augment the above optimization problem by the variable ω¯ and the condition
V
(
ω¯, Ω˜|Rep′ = 1
)
=V
(
ω¯, Ω˜|Rep′ = 0
)
. I call this trick “anticipation of future choices” because
what we essentially do here is to explicitly anticipate one of the choices that the government
has to make tomorrow and incorporate it into todays problem − with the aim of being able to
reduce the state space.
This means, that by complicating the optimization problem only slightly (by adding one
equation and one variable), we are able to reduce the computationally necessary state space
from 7D to 4D61. This brings about a massive reduction in computation time.
59If L is constant it is enough to know E and W . Furthermore, given separable utility, one could apply the
trick that I apply to the repayment decision also to L. Then, even with variable labor, knowing E, W and ω is
sufficient.
60 To see this note that the state variables only appear in the above problem in these combinations.
61A reduction to 5D is feasible without this trick, and a further reduction to 3D would be feasible by applying
the same trick to the labor decision.
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Analytical evaluation of integrals:
The state space reduction method just described yields a transformed problem, in which the
default threshold tomorrow ω¯ is a choice variable. This means that the approximation of the
integral in the expectations over tomorrows policy function becomes more important: If we used
discrete approximation of the exogenous state variable, the integral would be a step function in
ω¯. If we used the trapezoidal rule, the integral would exhibit kinks in ω¯. This would hamper the
efficiency of the use of derivative based solvers for smooth problems. Instead I approximate the
expectations over tomorrows policy function by the exact evaluation of the integral given the
smooth cubic-spline approximation of the policy function. That is, if Z(Ω) is a policy or value
function and Z˜(Ω) a smooth approximation thereof, then E|Ω(Z ′) =
´∞
0 pdf(ω
′|Ω)Z(ω′|Ω)dω ´∞
0 pdf(ω
′|Ω)Z˜(ω′|Ω)dω.
This method differs from the quadrature approaches usually employed in the dynamic macro
literature. It extends or ’inverts’ the insight of Gaussian quadrature methods, that integrals
over polynomials can be evaluated exactly given a sufficient number of function values, to the
piecewise-polynomial cubic-spline function.
To illustrate the method, consider for example the continuous version of the canonical
Arellano (2008) model. Be B the debt level and ω¯ the default threshold (the level of exogenous
GDP below which it is optimal to default). Then the expectations of the value function are
given by E|Ω(V (ω′|B′)) =
´ ω¯
0 pdf(ω
′|ω)V def (ω′|B′)dω + ´∞
ω¯
pdf(ω′|ω)V rep(ω′)dω. Therefore
E|Ω(V (ω′|B′)) is a function not only of the endogenous state B′, but also of the default threshold
ω¯. Continuous interpolation/approximation of V implies smoothness of the expectation in
the endogenous state. If combined with exact integration it also implies smoothness of the
expectation with respect to the default threshold.
It is easy to use for 1 dimensional integrals and has two advantages: First, it avoids an
additional layer of approximation. Second, and more importantly for the current application,
it generates expectations that are twice continuously differentiable not only in the endogenous
states, but also in the exogenous states. This facilitates the application of continuous solution
methods to optimization problems where the exogenous state appears as a variable. This is the
case once we represent the government’s problem with post decision state variables.
This approach could be applied given any approximating function. Given a piecewise linear
approximation of Z(Ω), it is equivalent to trapezoidal rule, but then it does not deliver the
second advantage. For chebychev polynomials, the other commonly used twice continuous ap-
proximating function, it is equivalent to piecewise Gaussian quadrature with enough quadrature
points.
Algorithm:
Apart from the way to deal with the state space and to evaluate integrals (expectations), the
time iteration algorithm I use is a standard one loop algorithm, commonly used in the sovereign
default literature.
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where W˜ = (KB + KH)α +(1− δ) (KB + KH)−Rep(BT −BB) and ς0 + ς1W˜ is the result
of a regression of KF on W˜ . I use (8,10,8,5) points.
2. Make an initial guesses for the functions uc(C), λ2 and VG across the points of this grid.
3. From these guesses and this grid, construct a interpolant for each of the 3 functions. In
particular I use using cubic splines with not-a-knot end conditions as recommended by
Hatchondo et al. (2007). I extrapolate points outside the grid using these splines, but
choose the grid such as to ensure that the maximum distance from the grid remains small
and the probability of leaving the grid marginal.
4. For each of the points on the grid, solve the optimization problem from appendix A
transformed as described above,62 i.e. augmented by the additional variable ω¯ and the
additional equation V
(
ω¯, Ω˜|Rep′ = 1
)
=V
(
ω¯, Ω˜|Rep′ = 0
)
and using the previous itera-
tions approximations Z˜(Ω) to evaluate expectations.
5. Check the difference between the previous guess and the solutions at the grid points
obtained. If they are very similar stop. Else update the initial guess and return to point
3.
The whole code is written in MATLAB. To solve the continuous optimization problem at each
of the grid points at step 4 of the algorithm, I use the solver KNITRO, which is able to solve
smooth complementarity problems fast and reliably. To improve the performance of the solver,
I supply analytical first derivatives, which are largely computed and coded automatically using
MATLAB’s symbolic toolbox. Furthermore the code is executed in parallel.
Precision: Despite the fact that the policy functions exhibit minor kinks but are approxi-
mated by smooth functions, the precision of the result is satisfactory: The algorithm converges
successfully up to an average (across the grid) absolute change of the forward looking variables
of 0.0001%. Across a very long simulation the mean of the absolute value of the difference
between (1) the approximated solution Z˜(Ω) and (2) the solution as in step 4 of the algorithm
for the (also known as Euler Error, see Judd (1998)) is around 0.05% for the variables C and
λ2 and 0.005% for the value function VG .
62For computational convenience the governments problem is solved assuming the bond holding constraint
(11) holds with equality. It is then verified by simulation that λ3 
 0 in the ergodic distribution.
1. Define a Cartesian grid over the 4D alternative state vector. Instead of using
[
ω,E,KF , B˜
]
I rotate the grid so as to reduce the inclusion of regions of the state space into the grid,
which are never visited along the equilibrium path. In particular I use
[
ω, W˜ , E/W˜ ,KF − (ς0 + ς1W )
]
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Appendix C: Proofs
Proposition 1: Five steps are necessary to arrive to this result. First, note that the value
function of the bank Vb (d, b, k,Ω) can be summarized as a function Vb (e,Ω) of only one en-
dogenous state variable e = Rk + bRep − d since (b, d, k) only enter the problem as this linear
combination. Second, the solution of the problem of the bank [b′, d′, k′] and its value function
Vb (e,Ω) is linear in e. To proof this second claim, assume that Vb (e′,Ω′) is linear in e′. Be x a
solution to the bank’s problem given e and Ω. Denote the associated value function by V˜b(e,Ω)
. Then we can conclude that αx is optimal given αe for any α ∈ R+ since both the objective
and the constraints are linear in both e and x . (If there existed αx′ that is feasible given αe
such that V˜b(αx′,Ω) > V˜b(αx,Ω) then by linearity x′ would also be feasible given e and by
homogeneity it would dominate x.) Therefore the solution of the banks problem − given a
linear Vb (e′,Ω′) − is linear in e. Furthermore, by linearity the value of this solution V˜b(e,Ω)
also needs to be linear in e. Since the same reasoning applies to the value function of all the
following periods, the initial assumption that Vb (e′,Ω′) is linear in e′ must hold. Third, the first
and second result together imply Vb (e′,Ω′) is linear in [b′, d′, k′]. Fourth, given the third result
it is obvious that both the constraints and the objective of the optimization problem are affine
functions. Hence, the first order conditions are necessary and sufficient. Fifth, to determine
the derivative of the value function w.r.t equity Vbe(e′,Ω′) we can apply the envelope theorem
for maximization problems with inequality constraints: Vbe(e′,Ω′) = uc(c′) + ηλ′2. 
Proposition 2: First, note that the value of defaulting VGD(Ω) is independent of the level of
BX , hence VGD(Ω1) = VGD(Ω2). Second, if [T ∗2 , B′∗T2, X∗2 ] denotes the optimal level of all choice
variables under repayment given state Ω2, then[T ∗2 , B′∗T2, X∗2 ] is also feasible under repayment
given state Ω1 by the government budget constraint. Hence it must be that VGR(Ω1) ≥ VGR(Ω2).
Summarizing, we have VGD(Ω1) = VGD(Ω2) > VGR(Ω1) ≥ VGR(Ω2), and hence that Ω2 ∈ D.
Proposition 3: First, note that conditional on default or repayment, the vector [ω,E,KF , BX ]
sufficiently summarizes the 7 dimensional state Ω (Here E denotes the pre-dividend pre-transfer
bank equity E = RKB + RepBB − D). Second, note that the values of repayment are equal
VGR(Ω1) = VGR(Ω3) since the elements of the vector [ω,E,KF , BX ] conditional on repayment
are equal. Third, note that conditional on default, [ω,KF , BX ] are equal but the banks pre-
dividend pre-transfer equity is lower at Ω1. Denote the optimal level of all choice variables under
default given state Ω1 by [T ∗1 , B′∗T1, X∗1 , Z∗1 ] where Z denotes the transfer from the bank to the
household. Then, by choosing an appropriate transfer Z3 > Z1 the allocation [T ∗1 , B′∗T2, X∗1 ]
must be feasible given state Ω3. By optimality it must hence be that VGD(Ω3) ≥ VGD(Ω1).
Hence VGD(Ω3) ≥ VGD(Ω1) ≥ VGR(Ω1) = VGR(Ω3) and therefore Ω3 ∈ D.
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to be of size (ε − 1)k′ where ε ∼ f(ε) is an iid idiosyncratic random variable with mean 1.
Since there is a continuum of banks these flows cancel out on aggregate, but they require the
individual banks to adjust their balance sheets. Deposits are slow moving, they can not be
adjusted in the second sub-period. A bank that experiences a positive credit demand shock
ε > 1 therefore can do 2 things: It needs to either sell bonds or sell firm loans. Conversely,
a bank that experiences a negative credit demand shock ε < 1 can invest either in bonds or
in loans. Loans are assumed to be partially illiquid: When a loan is sold, a fraction 1 − κ of
the capital financed by the loan is lost. Let bˆ′ denote the amounts of bonds bought (or sold
if negative) in the secondary market and kˆ′+ ≥ 0 the amount of loans bought and kˆ′− ≤ 0
the amount of bonds sold. Let pˆ and qˆ denote the prices at which bonds are traded in the
secondary market. Note that these prices as well as the aggregate balance sheet of the financial
sector at the end of the sub-period are certain at the end of the first sub-period, since there is
no aggregate uncertainty about the second sub-period. The banks sequential problem can be
expressed a single optimization problem. In the first sub-period, it chooses both its beginning
of period portfolio b′, k′d′ and its end of period portfolio conditional in the realization of the
idiosyncratic shock bˆ′(ε), kˆ′−(ε), kˆ′+(ε):
Vb(d, b, k,Ω) = maxb′,k′d′,bˆ′(ε),kˆ′−(ε),kˆ′+(ε) (e + d
′/r − qb′ + k′)uc(c) + βE|Ω [Vb (e′,Ω′)]
st.
E|Ω [uc(c′)d′] ≤ E|Ω [uc(c′)θ(Rep′ b′ + R′ k′)]
(1 − η)e ≤ e + d′/r − qb′ − k′
b′, k′ ≥ 0
bˆ′qˆ + kˆ′+pˆ + kˆ′−κpˆ + k′(ε − 1) = 0 ∀ε
b + bˆ′ ≥ 0 ∀ε
kˆ′+ ≥ 0 ∀ε
−kˆ′− ≥ 0 ∀ε
where e′ = R′
(
kˆ′+ + kˆ′− + k′ε
)
+
(
bˆ′Rep + b′Rep
)
− d′
Appendix D: Microfounding banks exposure to the sovereign
In the main text banks were simply assumed to hold a fixed share of their assets in bonds. This
appendix presents a simple model to endogenize this assumption, where banks hold government
bonds because they are more liquid.
Assume that each period has two sub-period. In the first sub-period the continuum of
banks make the same choices as in the main text, subject to the same constraints but the bond
holding constraint. In the second sub-period banks are hit by idiosyncratic shocks: The firms
that borrowed from the bank in the first sub-period either require more funds (tap credit lines)
or return excess fund (early repayment). The bank is contractually obliged to accept these
changes in its loan portfolio and it can not default on this obligation. These flows are assumed
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For markets to clear in the second sub-period it must hold that
ε¯ˆ
ε
f(ε)bˆ′(ε)dε + Bˆ′x = 0
ε¯ˆ
ε
f(ε)kˆ′+(ε)dε +
ε¯ˆ
ε
f(ε)kˆ′−(ε)dεκ = 0
Here, the foreign demand for government debt in the second sub-period is determined by
the same condition as in the first sub-period. Since the government, by assumption, does not
issue any new bonds in this sub-period and since the aggregate demand for funds in the second
sub-period is 0, foreigners will not be buy bonds in the second sub-period, and all the assets
sold by the banks with a need for funds will be purchased by those banks with excess funds.
However, the foreigners demand pins down the price qˆ = q.
Under further simplifying assumptions, the solution to the bank’s problem is exactly the
same as that in the text. In particular, assume that ε is discretely distributed, with a maximum
value of ε¯. Assume thatprob(ε¯) is high enough and that κ is small enough (e.g. 0). It is hence
optimal for the bank to hold b′q = ε¯k just as in the main text the bank holds b′q = ψ(1−ψ)k.
More generally, the behavior for the bank in this model will look very much like in the
model in the main text, if the κ is small enough and f(ε¯) 
 0. Simulations of the model,
replacing the banks problem with the one outlined here with a uniformly distributed f(ε) have
confirmed that.
Furthermore, one could reinterpret this model as a model of collateralized lending. Under
this view, qˆ is the inverse interbank rate and bˆ′ the interbank claim. b ≥ −bˆ′ then is the
collateral constraint (one would only have to adjust e′, but that has no implications since the
distribution of bank equity is irrelevant and banks are risk neutral with respect to idiosyncratic
risk)
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Appendix E: Additional tables and figures
credit/GDP real GDP
p.c.
4 periods ahead -0.169*** -0.0791***
(0.009) (0.000)
3 periods ahead -0.145** -0.0837***
(0.022) (0.000)
2 periods ahead -0.109* -0.0676***
(0.083) (0.001)
1 period ahead -0.0279 -0.0667***
(0.644) (0.001)
contemporaneous -0.01000 -0.0489**
(0.864) (0.012)
1 period after 0.0165 -0.0407**
(0.780) (0.036)
2 periods after 0.00523 -0.0359*
(0.930) (0.065)
3 periods after -0.0129 -0.0324*
(0.828) (0.097)
4 periods after -0.00865 -0.0221
(0.883) (0.260)
Country specific linear trend  
# countries 187 194
# re-accesses 52 53
# observations 6022 6318
Pseudo R2 0.869 0.992
Table 5: Credit to GDP and GDP around market reaccess. This table reports the
results of regression from figure 1: The point estimates for βτ and − in parenthesis − p-values.
Credit to GDP and GDP per capita are both on logs.
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Variable Source Start Remark
Real GDP per capita IMF IFS and WEO (for the
forecast)
1980 A in constant prices
Private
Consumption/GDP
OECD 1980 A since 1995: private nondurable consumption
(P311A+P311B) / GDP (B1_GE); before1995 due
to missing data: private consumption (P31S14_S15 )
* the average of durable to total consumption
1995-2010
Investment/GDP OECD and WEO (for the
forecast)
1980 A OECD: Gross capital formation (P5 ) / GDP
(B1_GE)
Government
Consumption/GDP
OECD 1980 A Final consumption expenditure of general
government (P3S13 ) / GDP (B1_GE)
Trade Balance/GDP OECD 1980 A External balance of goods and services (B11 ) / GDP
(B1_GE)
TFP AMECO 1980 A
Balance sheet
composition of Greek
banks
Bank of Greece 2001 Q Aggregated balance sheet CI
Deposit-loan spread Bank of Greece 2001 Q Spread between short term household deposits and
loans according to Bank interest rates on new
euro-denominated deposits and loans vis-à-vis euro
area residents
International
investment position
Bank of Greece 2001 Q International investment position (BPM6)
Holders of sovereign
debt
Bank of Greece 2001 Q Financial Liabilities broken down by holding sectors
(S13 Q)
Sovereign spread IFS for Greece and
Bundesbank for Germany
2000 A difference between the returns Greek and German on
one year government bonds
Private credit/GDP IMF IFS 1998 A Financial sector credit to the real economy (line
22d)/ GDP (line99)
Sovereign debt/GDP IMF Historical Public Debt
Database
2000 A
Table 6: Data definitions and sources for the Greek case study. A stands for annual,
Q for quarterly data. Data from the Bank of Greece data is available only from 2001. Credit
is used from 1998 onwards since it displays a kink before that. Consumption, investment and
credit per capita are constructed multiplying the ratios with GDP.
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Figure 7: International investment position: Nominal values reported by Bank of Greece.
The figure distinguishes between public and private liabilities, and between debt liabilities and
total liabilities, including equity. For the government the latter two are almost identical.
Figure 8: Costs and benefits of default: This figure illustrates the costs and benefits of
default, and how they depend on the TFP.
The blue line plots the difference in the path of key variables for 2 scenarios, starting from the
same initial conditions (the risk adjusted steady state): In scenario (1) a negative TFP shock
hits the economy at t = 0 and the government repays. In scenario (2) the same TFP shock hits
the economy but the government defaults. No further shocks occur in either scenario. The red
line repeats the exercise for a good TFP shock. All plots are normalized by their steady state
values. Panel i) shows the evolution of TFP in the two cases.
The blue line in panel e) for example means: Given a negative TFP shock of -14% in year 0,
consumption is higher in years 0 and 1 under default than under repayment. The difference
equals 2.4% and 0.2% of steady state consumption in years 0 and 1.
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The positive shock is a 1 standard deviation shock. In this case repayment is optimal VGD(t =
0) < VGR(t = 0). The negative shock is chooses large enough to make default optimalVGD(t =
0) > VGR(t = 0) (see panel h). Kinks are the result of occasionally binding constraints in each
scenario, as in the figure 3.
This figure exemplifies how the costs and benefits of default depend on the level of TFP. Panels
e) and f) show that default leads to relatively more favorable paths for consumption and labor
if TFP is low: The difference in consumption is higher; the difference in labor is lower (on
average). Therefore, under default welfare is marginally higher in period 0 for the negative
TFP shock, but much lower for the positive TFP shock (pan. h).
But why does default lead to more desirable paths of consumption and labor only if TFP is
low? In states of high TFP the households would like to invest more (both because expected
returns are high and to smooth consumption), relative to the case of low TFP. At the same
time, banks equity is independent of TFP. Hence, the destruction of bank equity due to default
has stronger distortionary effects when TFP is high. This can be seen in panel d): The total
amount of loans (i.e. capital) drops much more (relative to the repayment case) under the
positive shock than under the negative shock. These distortions constitute the cost of default.
Given that the resource gain from defaulting on the rest of the world is independent of the
state, but its utility value is higher in bad times, the net costs of default are bigger in states of
high TFP.
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